According to the statements of October 31, 2019 by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, the corvette Gremyashchiy (project 20385), then off the coast of Kaliningrad and on board which the Russian president was, will, in addition to being assigned to the Pacific Fleet, be equipped with the 3M22 hypersonic missile Tsirkon (SS-N-23 in NATO classification), reputed to be able to reach Mach 8 and a range of 400 km. The strategic message about the value of Russia's naval presence in the Pacific is clear.
The Russian military maritime fleet (Военно-Морской Флот (ВМФ) – Voienno-Morskoy Flot (VMF) is engaged in a decisive period where the future and especially the relevance of maintaining oceanic capabilities is being discussed in Russian decision-making circles. , almost always inherited from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Most naval programs regularly experience slowness and delays. Rare are those built within acceptable deadlines, compatible with the assigned objectives. Only conventionally powered submarines of project 636.3 and the nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of projects 955, 955A and 955B. The situation is quite different for programs for large surface buildings, whether for overhauls or new constructions.
These are the corvette projects which, year in and year out, record the most acceptable production rates not because of the speed of the shipyards but because of the intrinsic characteristics of these low tonnage and small dimensions, inexpensive buildings which make it possible to multiply orders and lay-ups in a large number of shipyards. By the mid-2030s, and assuming that the targets planned for the various projects regularly turn into orders for laying down, then the Russian Navy should admit into active service up to 64 corvettes of the projects 20380 (10) 20385 (8) 20386 (7) 21630 (3) 21631 (12) 22160 (6) et 22800 (18)
But only project buildings 20385, 20386, 21631 et 22800 have or will have 3S-14 octuple launchers UKSK (Univeral cruise ship complete or multipurpose firing system) numbering one or two per building depending on the project considered. These systems can accommodate the 3M-55 supersonic anti-ship missiles Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile in the NATO classification), 3M22 hypersonic anti-ship missiles Tsirkon (SS-N-23 (NATO) et 3M-54 cruise missiles Kalibr (SS-N-27 Sizzler in NATO classification) and RPK-9 anti-submarine missiles Teddy bear (SS-N-29 (NATO) plus other variants of the 3M-54 Kalibr.
It should be noted that the 3M22 hypersonic anti-ship missile Tsirkon requires, certainly due to the heat of the gases produced during firing, a modernized version of the launcher: theUSKS-M. The naval platform to receive this hypersonic missile must therefore logically be equipped with it.
the corvette Gremyashchiy (2019) is one of the two buildings of project 20385 with the Provornyy. They are to be admitted to active service in 2019 for the benefit of the Pacific Fleet after having been laid down, respectively, in 2011 and 2013. Their vertical launch system consists of a 3S-14 octuple launcher UKSK(-M?) and two octuple Poliment-Redut launchers hosting anti-aircraft missiles.
This Russian presidential decision unveiled on October 31 paves the way for the introduction of hypersonic anti-ship missiles, which can only constitute a clear message to naval actors in the Pacific Ocean that if Russia records a regression, in general, of the tonnage of its fleet and the slowness of its renewal, in terms of quality it intends to maintain the comparison and be present on the decisive operational capacities. There would still be no defense against a missile that could reach up to Mach 8.
Decision which increases, once again, the strategic value of Russian corvettes equipped with UKSK/UKSK-M launchers, of which 45 units equipped with these launchers could be admitted to active service until the 2030s. These can, by their dimensions, navigate in coastal waters, even on the course of rivers for certain projects, and in the high seas where they exert a decisive influence either on land through cruise missiles (3M-54 Kalibr), or at sea facing isolated naval units, or even naval groups made up of their future hypersonic anti-ship missiles (3M-22 Tsirkon) which few or no marines can counter. Enough to strengthen the access denial capabilities of the Russian navy.