The tensions surrounding Iranian-British relations served as a revealer of a major weakness of the Royal Navy, namely the low number of its surface units, too insufficient to be able to deploy a coherent and dissuasive force on its own. And in fact, since 1990, it has lost, through the various "modernization" and "rationalization" programs which were legion in Europe on the altar of the "benefits of Peace", no less than 30 frigates out of the fifty which she had at the time. For its part, the French Navy did not fare better, having seen its fleet of Aviso eliminated from inventories, as will soon be that of second-rate frigates, represented by the La Fayette class.
In fact, the two main European navies, those which have aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, are facing a significant deficit in terms of surface fleet, a deficit which will not be made up by the current programs, whether the British Type 26 and 31 frigates, or by the Alsace class and the French FDI. However, both could find great benefits in deploying a fleet of corvettes, ships that are lighter and less expensive than frigates, but perfectly suited for numerous missions ranging from anti-submarine warfare to the escort of civilian ships. . In this article, we will study the opportunity to develop a new class of Franco-British corvettes, in order to quickly reduce the operational deficit observed, with a minimum impact on public finances.
Without going into detail about the exact needs of the two navies, we will take as a working basis a corvette of 2200 to 2500 tonnes loaded, with a capacity for self-protection and close anti-aircraft protection by 2x8 CAAM missiles or Mica VL, with real ASW capacity with Mu90 tubes and hull sonar, 8 MM40 type anti-ship missiles, a 57mm cannon, 2 20mm protection turrets, and a platform and helicopter hangar for a 6 ton device such as HIL or Super-Lynx. The new ship must have a very high degree of automation, and a reduced crew compared to standards, a sea endurance of 20 days and a top speed of 30 knots. These characteristics make it the direct successor of the Gowind 2500 corvette, but also of the British Type 21 frigates. These corvettes will also be optimized to collaborate together, particularly in ASW, as well as with the frigates of the two navies. We can therefore target a unit price of €300m, and a design price of €600m, with the sole obligation of having a rate of imported equipment not exceeding 5% (unlike Gowind for example, of which one a large part of the equipment is not of French origin).
For the French Navy, the need can be estimated at 18 units, i.e. 6 units for the Atlantic coast, 6 units for the Mediterranean coast, and 1 unit per overseas zone in addition to the Surveillance Frigate, in order to have 2 armed buildings per zone. For the Royal Navy, we will admit a similar need, knowing that the exact needs deserve their own study. In this model, we will admit that each country will build 1,5 ships per year, or 18 ships in 12 years, with a study phase of 2 years, or a program with a lifespan of 14 years.
The cost for each state will therefore be 1,5 x 300 m€ = 450 m€, or 500 m€ taking into account the helicopters and drones necessary for the implementation of this fleet.
Taking into consideration the studies carried out by the Positive Valorization Defense doctrine, we know that the increase of one million euros invested in the Defense industry finances 10 direct jobs from the BITD, 9 subcontracting jobs, and 8 jobs induced by consumption of 19 industrial jobs. The €500 million per year required to finance this program will therefore finance or generate 5000 direct jobs, 4500 subcontracting jobs, and 4000 induced jobs, or 13500 jobs.
In France, a job generates on average €24.000 each year in social charges and taxes paid by companies, while each employee pays, for their part, on average, €6000 in taxes, through VAT, l income tax, etc. In fact, a job generates €30.000 in social and tax revenue each year. However, today, the State compensates for the deficits of social organizations, which do not have the right, statutorily, to incur debt. In fact, the State directly saves the social revenues paid under this contract. It therefore has a budget balance of €30.000 per job per year. The 13.500 related jobs will therefore generate 405 million in direct budget balance, bringing the real cost on the budget to €95 million per year, or €1,140 million over the 12 years of manufacturing.
To this amount will be added two levels of additional revenue:
- social and therefore budgetary savings on the share of jobs created leaving compensated unemployment, as well as budgetary savings on supporting people looking for work (compensated or not), including in particular professional training. Estimates of these costs vary greatly depending on the methods used, ranging from €15.000 per year to €55.000 per year. An amount of €20.000 per year seems reasonable, knowing that the unemployed receive on average €15.000 per year net of compensation.
- Revenues from potential export orders for these corvettes.
Without going into an in-depth study, it therefore appears more than likely that the budgetary return of the program for France is positive in practice. Taking a social economy of €20.000 on 50% of jobs, and an export rate of 15%, consistent with previous French naval programs, the budgetary return rate exceeds 120% for the State. For the United Kingdom, this rate rises to 80%, the social security and tax rates in Great Britain being lower than in France. The fact remains that each corvette will only cost the British state budget £60 million, after deduction of taxes, social security contributions and additional taxes collected.
The Study Phase, i.e. €300m per country, undergoes the same breakdown, excluding exports, with a neutral return for France, and a return of 65% for the United Kingdom, reducing its budgetary cost to £85m. In total, a new generation 2x18 corvette program for the Royal Navy and the French Navy would therefore cost the British budget £1,165 million over 14 years, while it would bring in a little more than €1 billion to the French budget. taking into account the 28 additional naval helicopters per navy, and as many on-board aerial drones.
The implementation of such a program is therefore largely within the reach of the public finances of the two countries, and would, moreover, mark a strong desire for cooperation in the naval field for the two countries, set to become increasingly strategic. in the years to come. All that is missing, in short, is a marked political will to give birth to this program, and to reconstitute, in just over 10 years, a significant part of the naval power of the two oldest European nations.