The Japanese authorities have sent Washington a request for information concerning the status of "partner" of the F35 program, with the aim of trying to join it while Turkey, one of the first level partners of the program, has just been joined. excluded. With the new order of 63 F35As in addition to the 42 aircraft ordered in 2013, and 42 F35Bs intended to embark on the Izumo class aircraft-carrying destroyers, Tokyo is today the program's first export customer and, as such, wishes to have its say on its orientations in the years to come.
But the Japanese request is not very favorably received by Washington. Indeed, many players in the program came forward following Ankara's exclusion, including Japan and Israel, while the industrial divisions are already very stretched between existing partners. It is therefore difficult to satisfy current customers and prospects, such as Finland, Singapore or Switzerland, who are also asking for industrial compensation. Above all, the United States knows perfectly well that Japan is developing its own 5th generation combat aircraft program, intended to replace the most recent F2s and F15Js over the next decade. By integrating partner status, Japan would have access to technologies that could be integrated into its new program.
It remains to be seen whether the American authorities will be able to keep the door ajar towards the program's most important client for a long time, and, what is more, a strategic ally of the United States to contain the rise of Chinese power, at least for a while. time. Tokyo will not be satisfied with a secondary status indefinitely, especially since a certain imbalance is being created today between the program's NATO partners and clients, namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Canada, currently representing less than 350 firm aircraft orders, and Pacific theater customers, Japan, South Korea and Australia, which represent nearly 250 aircraft ordered, for a one and only partner, Australia. However, the requirements in these two theaters diverge greatly, particularly in terms of range of action, naval strike capabilities and, more prosaically, potential adversaries.