A photo appeared this weekend on social networks showing 15 destroyers in a single shot at various stages of completion in the Shanghai Arsenal was widely shared and commented on by the Defense sphere. In fact, it showed 3 type 052 destroyers in maintenance, 8 type 52D destroyers in various states of completion, but also 2 heavy type 055 sea destroyers being fitted out, and two others under construction. This new building, measuring almost 13.000 tons and carrying more than 120 missiles, if it is called "heavy destroyer" by the Chinese nomenclature, meets much more the definition of the cruiser, as will be the Russian Liders, including the first two examples. should enter service before 2030, and which will measure, according to the Russian authorities, almost 19.000 tons with nuclear propulsion.
Why are we seeing these heavy surface combatant ships reappear, and would they be of interest to the French and European Marines?
What is a cruiser?
In a trivial way, we tend to classify buildings according to the gauge criterion, i.e. the mass of the volume of water that it displaces:
- from 1000 to 3500 tons, it's a corvette
- From 3500 to 6500 tonnes, it is a frigate
- From 6500 tons to 10.000 tons, a destroyer
- And beyond that, a cruiser.
This classification is, however, as arbitrary as it is subject to debate, as this sole criterion does not constitute a building. Another definition would be to characterize the main mission(s) of buildings:
- A corvette is designed for coastal waters, or to reinforce the defense of a major unit
- The frigate specializes in escorting and protecting a unit in a particular area, such as anti-submarine warfare, and has self-defense capabilities in other areas.
- The destroyer is capable of protecting a major building in several areas, as well as strengthening its strike capabilities, with, for example, its artillery and cruise missiles.
In this classification, what would be the role of the cruiser? It would in fact be a building with the firepower, combat autonomy and resilience to carry alone, or accompany, a decisive strike so as to gain the tactical advantage in a given area. In other words, the cruiser is, above all, an offensive weapon, and not a defensive one, like other ships.
The September 2015 deployment of the Slava-class cruiser Moskva off the coast of Tartous, as a preamble to the Russian intervention in Syria, represents the cruiser's function quite well: in a short time, it had changed the configuration of the theater in taking possession of a Defense bubble including useful Syria and a large part of the waters surrounding the country, forcing Turks, Westerners and belligerents to take significant and restrictive measures in the pursuit of their operations.
The modern cruiser today
Few modern ships can meet the definition we have given of what a cruiser should be. There are obviously the 2 Kirov class heavy cruisers and the 3 Slava of the Russian navy, but, even modernized, they cannot be considered “modern” ships. The most important class of cruisers today is represented by the American Ticonderoga, also called "Aegis cruisers". But the specialization in the field of aircraft carrier escort of these ships makes them more heavy destroyers than cruisers. Conversely, the 3 heavy destroyers of the Zumwalt class, although lighter, meet this functional definition perfectly. Powerfully armed, fast, maneuverable, discreet, they are offensive weapons par excellence, intended to suppress opposing defenses, in particular access denial systems, then to seize the area, until the group arrives. naval aviation to exploit the acquired tactical advantage.
The Chinese Type 055 also meet this definition. Their firepower is sufficiently significant and varied to not only carry the rupture, but exploit it over the long term, the time necessary for the new Chinese aircraft carriers and assault ships to reach the area safely.
The future Russian Leaders also meet this requirement. However, the role of these ships will likely be different from those of the Chinese and American navies. On the one hand, the Russian fleet does not have or will not have aircraft carriers and major assault ships in sufficient numbers to exploit these ruptures. On the other hand, because Russia is the only one to choose, for the moment, nuclear propulsion, providing these future vessels with very significant autonomy at sea, and therefore a much smaller logistical footprint. These buildings will therefore probably have more of a “Hit and Fade” type function, to eliminate or disrupt the adversary's command posts, logistics zones and assembly zones. Nothing will also prevent the Lider from being used as a privateer, like the German light cruisers and battleships during the Second World War, although this strategy did not particularly appeal to the Kriegsmarine.
However, it is interesting, and notable, to note that the two countries most dynamic in terms of technology and access denial strategies, Russia and China, are also those which most favor this design of modern cruisers. Would the cruiser be the anti-access denial weapon par excellence?
A cruiser for what?
Since the Second World War, the aircraft carrier and the submarine have established themselves as the offensive vessels par excellence in Western navies. The reach and firepower provided by the onboard aircraft, and the stealth of the submarine, were incomparable to what a battleship or cruiser could offer. Little by little, surface ships evolved towards the role of escorting aircraft carriers and assault ships.
But in recent years, a profound change has been at work, characterized by what we usually call denial of access. The range, effectiveness and precision of anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems force aircraft carriers to act from much further away, and with much more precaution than previously. If submarines always benefit from a saving discretion, this is all the more effective as the adversary does not have the freedom to implement its anti-submarine warfare aviation as it wishes. If the role of the aircraft carrier and submarines remains essential and is not called into question, access denial systems nevertheless limit their effectiveness over time and escape.
This is precisely where the cruiser finds its place. Not only is it designed to gain the upper hand and destroy these access denial systems, but it is also able to impose its own access denial logic, once its main mission has been accomplished.
Heavier, very well armed, and powerful, the cruiser also takes the role of capital ship in a Navy, or in a naval group. It can therefore send, like an aircraft carrier, a strong political message, by its simple deployment.
The economic criterion
If the cruiser does not replace the aircraft carrier, it complements it wonderfully, and even acts as a multiplier for it. But such a building is expensive, and the economic equation risks putting it beyond the reach of all European navies.
Indeed, for a 15.000 ton vessel, carrying around forty cruise missiles, around sixty anti-aircraft missiles, one or two major artillery pieces, at least two helicopters and all detection and protection systems , and necessary drones, the unit price should reach or even exceed €2,5 billion. In other words, for 1 cruiser, a navy could afford 3 FREMM type destroyers. However, if the cruiser, by the concentration of power it provides, has capacities greater than those of 3 frigates, it does not have the ubiquity. This explains, in large part, the arbitration often made against heavy surface combatants.
But this calculation comes from an imperfect appreciation of the economic reality of the application of costs. Thus, if a cruiser costs the price of 3 frigates to purchase, it only costs the price of one and a half to use, due to the crew being smaller than that of the 3 buildings, but also maintenance more concentrated on fewer systems. However, operating and usage costs represent 50% of the real costs of owning a combat vessel. Simply applying this factor already reduces the gap between 3 frigates and 1 cruisers.
But above all, the budgetary return on defense investment is optimal on acquisition costs, exceeding 150% by the application of direct, indirect and induced jobs created, while they are only 50% concerning personnel costs. Without entering into tedious calculations, the application of these parameters shows that economically, the budgetary balance linked to the acquisition and operation of a cruiser is positive over its lifespan, with a surplus of the order of 15%, while it is neutral for 1, 2 or 3 frigates/destroyers.
Conclusion
The arguments in favor of the return of cruisers to the inventories of European navies are therefore numerous. Having significant military and naval capabilities, offering a response to the challenge of access denial systems, complementary to aircraft carriers, the cruiser is, moreover, endowed with a positive economic equation.
The fact remains that, in industrial matters as well as from a military and political point of view, paradigm shifts take a very long time to be accepted, and it is unlikely that a French or European cruiser program will appear in the coming years.
While we continue to boast of our ability to innovate, our appetite for agile thinking and our flexibility, the fact remains that today, it is China and Russia which are proving more of these qualities, and which will be equipped with cruisers in the years to come...