For almost twenty years, following the sale of 7 A69 Avisos to Turkey that were not replaced, then the uninterrupted reduction in the format of the surface combatant fleet, the French Navy has been forced to increase operational pressure on the crews of its frigates, in order to meet the needs it faces. It was thus common to see frigates, notably the FLF of the Lafayette class, carrying out more than 180, and sometimes even 200, days at sea per year. This excessive pressure had notable consequences on the training of crews, as well as on the morale of personnel, often faced with significant tensions in terms of family life.
Today, the French Navy only has 15 so-called “1st rank” frigates, including 6 FREMM, 2 FDA Horizon, 1 anti-aircraft frigate, 1 ASM frigate and 5 light Stealthy frigates, hastily reclassified in this category. that does not have the characteristics (absence of sonar, weak anti-aircraft capabilities, etc.) compared to 18 3 years ago, following the withdrawal of two ASW frigates and an anti-aircraft frigate, arriving at the limit of age.
This reduction in size, associated with the reduction in the size of the crews, a FREMM only carrying a crew of 130 men compared to 250 for the Type 70 anti-submarine frigates that they replace, allows the French Navy to consider transforming part of its fleet towards double-crew management, following the example of what has been practiced for decades for the Royal Navy's submarines. Concretely, a frigate having an operational availability much higher than that of its crew, each ship will be equipped with 2 crews, each manning the building in rotation of 4 months. An experimental phase is currently being carried out on the frigates Aquitaine in Brest, and Languedoc in Toulon.
By proceeding in this way, the French Navy estimates that it will be able to keep its FREMM frigates at sea 180 days per year, compared to 110 today, while the crews will only do 90. Thus, it will benefit from an equivalent fleet operational of 10 FREMM compared to 6 today, and this without even having to increase staff, as well as better trained personnel less exposed to tensions. It is difficult not to see only advantages in this decision, which has also been put forward by some since the entry into service of the FREMM.
However, this measure, if very effective in times of peace, or moderate tensions, risks turning out to be a serious handicap as soon as significant tensions appear. Indeed, the Navy will not have the capacity to increase its resources in the event of a crisis, which is nevertheless one of its priority missions. Thus, during the Falklands War, the Royal Navy mobilized 43 of its 53 combat ships, or 80% of its theoretical fleet, and 22 of the 24 ships of the auxiliary fleet, or 90% of the theoretical force. Today, due to the drastic reduction of its format to only 21 combat ships (18 frigates and destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 TCD), it has only been able to deploy one frigate and one destroyer in the Persian Gulf during the tanker crisis, i.e. 10% of its theoretical fleet. Its European allies were also unable to overcome this operational deficit, also exposed to the same problem.
In fact, the concept of double crewing may appear satisfactory in peacetime, and in particular to maintain crew performance at the highest level, for example during periodic maintenance. On the other hand, it cannot serve as a basis for designing an operational format. Even when the 6 FREMMs are double crewed, the French Navy will still be missing at least 3 1st rank frigates, and 12 light frigates or corvettes (as well as 4 submarines, etc.) to achieve the necessary format for address the risks it faces, and the protection needs of overseas territories and the French coasts.