To complete the acquisition of EBRC Jaguar light tanks and troop transports VBMR Griffon as part of the CaMo program, signed at the end of 2018 with France, Brussels has published its expectations concerning its future Command and Liaison Vehicle, or VCL. These light armored vehicles, of which 322 units will be ordered, will replace the 439 Iveco LVMs currently in service.
The Belgian requirements are numerous, and relatively restrictive, since the vehicle must have a combat mass of 8,5 tonnes, with 1,5 tonnes of payload, must be able to receive an armor kit which will concern 15% of the fleet, and must be air transportable by A400M aircraft. 135 of them will be equipped with a light remote-operated turret using a 7,62mm machine gun which will be supplied by the Belgian FH Herstal. Vehicles must offer STANAG 2 protection against small arms, and 2A against IEDs. A budget of €124 million was released for the “initial purchase” part by Brussels.
Few vehicles meet this robotic portrait today, especially since Brussels requires that the equipment be in service in a NATO armed force. According to FOB site – Forces Operations Blog, only the Hawkei from Thales, Eagle V from GLDS-Mowag and LMV 2 from Iveco meet it. However, this description of performance and prerequisites corresponds precisely to the Scarabée of the French Arquus, an armored vehicle that we presented in detail recently. Apart from the purely operational criterion, the light armored vehicle perfectly meets Belgian expectations, but also provides functionalities which could be very useful to the Belgian forces, the first being its “SCORPION-Ready” design, the Scarabée having been designed for the French VBAE program . The other advanced features of the Arquus light armored vehicle, such as its hybrid propulsion, its ability to evolve autonomously or in a controlled manner, its very high mobility, or its scalability, would make it an ideal candidate in this approach.
Belgium having demonstrated a real determination to get closer to the French industrial standard with the CaMo program, it would certainly be interesting to quickly assess the potential that would represent the acceleration of the VBAE program in France, integrated into the SCORPION program, so to have a complete range of armored vehicles sharing the same DNA, in France as in Belgium, in the very spirit of the Camo program. In addition, and as we mentioned in the article devoted to it, the Scarabée has a significant capacity to evolve, in particular towards functions compatible with high intensity engagements, whether for close air protection, anti-tank warfare, or electronic warfare. These aspects, which will not fail to impose themselves very quickly in the requirements of European staffs, would therefore make it possible to have a homogeneous global fleet, simplifying maintenance, but offering a vast range of operational capabilities, while retaining its strengths in terms of connectivity and mobility.
In any case, and beyond the purely mercantile aspects, it would be a shame to limit the scope of the CaMo program and the Franco-Belgian industrial collaboration that it induces, to only the 2 vehicles on which it concerns today, for a simple question of non-synchronization of the calendars of a few years between the programs of the two armies. If France indeed wants to become the driving force behind a strong and autonomous Defense Europe, it must also demonstrate internal flexibility to provide relevant responses at the right time to its European operational and industrial partners.