To say that the rise of Chinese and Russian military forces is at the heart of the Pentagon's concerns would be an understatement. But what is most striking today are the numerous declarations from general officers at the top of the hierarchy, who consider that these two countries could have military ascendancy over the United States, if a confrontation were to occur.
This is the case of General David Berger, new commander of the United States Marine Corps. In his first public speech Since taking office in July 2019 at the highly influential and highly respected Heritage Foundation, General Berger has declared that the corps, perceived in the United States as an elite unit, was not ready to face adversaries like the Russian or Chinese forces, and added that the corps was simply not ready for high-intensity warfare. In clarifying his thoughts, the American general insisted on the effectiveness of naval and air access denial systems, but he also indicated that, in his opinion, the US Marines Corps, and the US Navy with it, had lost the ability to support large-scale and long-duration naval, naval and amphibious actions, such as those that would be required in the Pacific if a conflict were to break out there.
Very often, when a general officer in General Berger's position makes this type of speech, it is to ask for additional resources, as was the case for example with Norwegian general Rune Jakobson a few days ago. But that is not the position of the American officer. On the contrary, aware that the country was likely to face economic difficulties in the near future, he indicated that the solutions must be found "in the Marine Corps itself", and not in the pockets of its fellow citizens. To do this, the American Marines would have to re-acquire the know-how of high-intensity warfare, and the fundamentals that have made the reputation of this corps, such as amphibious operations.
General Berger's intervention is in line with those of many general officers, especially French, who are today concerned about the insufficient capabilities of the forces entrusted to them in terms of combat against a major technological adversary like Russia or China. Indeed, these two countries have rebuilt their defense tools on this sole hypothesis, and have therefore made their technological, material and human arbitrations for the sole purpose of constituting a force optimized for high-intensity combat. Conversely, Western countries, and in particular those which, like the United States, Great Britain or France, have been very involved in external operations, have for two decades sought to transform their forces, initially designed to high intensity, towards a model of medium or low intensity warfare, or even hybrid warfare. This is how, for example, US Army Stryker brigades, whose function was precisely to be able to be deployed very quickly by air means, and to be optimized to face asymmetric engagements, such as those encountered in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Unfortunately, at the turn of the new decade in 2010, it quickly became evident that the geostrategic context was evolving rapidly, and that both Russia and China were engaged in a profound transformation of their military tools, their doctrines, as well as their ambitions. However, it was not until the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbass, and the annexation of the China Sea that the great Western powers admitted, without acting, that the paradigms of the 2000s were over. And it took a few more years for these countries to convince themselves of the need to re-capitalize the military tool. In fact, in the majority of NATO countries, the effective increase in defense effort only occurred after 2015, i.e. 10 years after commitment. early Russian reforms and Chinese.
The problem of these high-intensity combats is already at the heart of the reforms underway in the US Army, and will very probably be for the future planning programs of the European armed forces. The fact remains that between today and obtaining a force adapted to this type of engagement, and available in sufficient volume, will take between 15 and 20 years, during which Europe will remain very vulnerable, due to lack of anticipation and sufficient consideration at the political level of this threat. Due to its demographic and economic superiority over Russia, Europe could significantly reduce this time, leaving the United States completely free to contain Chinese power. Awareness still needs to be raised at the political level, and this within a short time frame. Because if European programs, like FCAS, Tempest and MGCS, are preparing today for the world of 2040, they leave Europe very vulnerable between 2020 and 2040, without this seeming to worry anyone….