Will Roper, the Director of Acquisitions and new strong man of the US Air Force, apparently won his case regarding his vision of future American aeronautical industrial programs. On October 2, he appointed Colonel Dale White, until now director of surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and special operations programs, to the new position of Program Executive Office for Advanced Aircraft, specially created for this purpose.
In this position, Colonel White will be responsible for transforming the current operation of the US Air Force's acquisition and development programs, based on competitions between manufacturers and very long-term contracts, such as the F35, towards management in smaller, more recurring and more specialized series, borrowing from software development its project management paradigms such as Agile. In the sights, the development of a new “Century series” of aircraft for the US Air Force, which would make it possible to design specialized and efficient aircraft, with cost and risk control broken down across all programs. , and a better distribution of work in the American BITD.
Better distribute work to preserve BITD
This last notion clearly refers to the difficult situation that Boeing is going through today following the choice of Lockheed-Martin for the US Air Force's F-22 and F-35 programs, leaving the Seattle giant with little opportunities to develop new technologies and new concepts, and even risking making it lose part of its know-how in this critical area, at the risk of leaving Lockheed with a monopoly considered problematic.
The parallel with the situation in Europe is obvious. Thus, Europeans, who also want to preserve their industrial assets and know-how in the aeronautics field, are heading towards the development of two new devices, the FCAS bringing together France, Germany and Spain, and the Tempest which brings together Great Britain, Italy and Sweden. But where Will Roper wants to develop shorter specialized series, both to have more efficient devices in their missions because they are designed for, and to better distribute the work between manufacturers, the Europeans remain locked in the concept of the multi-device. function and very long-term programs, leading to the design of two devices that will be as similar as the Rafale and Typhoon, and abandoning entire sections of the market to American or Asian industries.
The example of the French FREMM frigates is enlightening
And in fact, the European calculation is truncated by a poor assessment of program costs, and the ambition to always do “the best for less”. It is this doctrine which brought back the French FREMM fleet from 17 units for €8 billion, to 8 units for…€8,5 billion. In fact, the industrial cost is not linked to unit production, but mainly to the active payroll. However, Naval Group, at the time DCNS, had scaled itself to produce 17 FREMMs at a rate of 1 unit every 7 months to meet the specifications of the FREMM program. When short-term budgetary decisions reduced the number of ships, this wage bill remained, and the state company that is Naval Group could not reduce it quickly. In fact, over the same period, the Lorient arsenals produced 6 FREMMs, plus two FREDAs under construction, instead of 17, for an equivalent overall cost... As for the French Navy, it had to order 5 FDI Belh@rra to replace 5 FREMM canceled, because the design offices of Naval Group and Thales found themselves in underactivity, which added €4 billion to the bill, for ships that were lighter and less well armed than the FREMM, even if they had Sea Fire radar and an advanced digital system.
But the disaster does not stop there, since Naval Group's FREMMs, instead of being able to be offered around €500 million per unit on the international market, have seen their price increase beyond €750 million, reducing the addressable market and the performance-price ratio of vessels. It is also a comparable argument which was put forward by Naval Group to justify the development of the FDI, less expensive and better suited than the FREMM (at €750m) to international competitions… We find several similar examples during last 20 years, notably concerning the Tiger helicopter which increased from €10 to €35 million, going from 220 to 65 units ordered, but also the Rafale, the Leclerc tank… So many systems which, today, deserve to be available in greater quantities in our armies. In total, since 2000, the cancellations, postponements and reductions in the format of Defense programs will have caused a loss of nearly €20 billion in the armed forces' equipment budget.
Towards a reduction in the size of F35 in the US Air Force?
Will Roper's positions and ambitions do not only make people across the Atlantic happy, and voices are already being raised to try to derail what seems to be the most relevant initiative of the last 40 years in terms of industrial policy of Defense in the West. The cause is simple: the Century series that he recommends will necessarily erode the US Air Force's F35A forecast format. Indeed, with the appearance of more specialized aircraft, therefore more efficient in their fields and more reliable, because they do not require having to respond to all scenarios, the F35A will quickly find itself in unfavorable competition in many missions. Unless the US Air Force plans to double its overall size in the coming years, there will not be enough pilots and ground personnel to justify 1750 F35As and 4 or 5 specialized combat aircraft in series. more than 250 units. In fact, the number of F35As ordered by the US Air Force will necessarily decrease.
However, the F35 program was designed to be able to fight, not against other ground-to-air devices and systems, but against political and industrial attacks. To do this, Lockheed-Martin has distilled the investments and activities linked to the program into a large number of states and counties, chosen for their political weight in Washington. Furthermore, if the F35 program were to be cut by 500 aircraft by the USAF, the consequences in terms of price and image would be very significant, and would restrict the aircraft's chances of continuing to prevail in competitions. international, effectively hindering the American control over the Defense of its allies. It is not surprising to see, therefore, political figures from all sides being moved by Will Roper's initiative.
Conclusion
But the parameter rarely taken into account by the various analyzes relating to the new Century series, the F35 and even the FCAS, is the development planning of those who are at the origin of these upheavals, namely China and the Russia. Because if the latter seems to be placing the emphasis today on the Su-57 as the basis for the development of its next range of specialized heavy aircraft, taking over from the Su-27, China is involved in a “small series with high recurrence” program for almost 30 years. It is thanks to this approach that the country went, in 30 years, from the production of 3rd generation devices copied or under Russian license, to the J-10, J15/16 and J20 over the last 10 years. On average, a new model of combat aircraft is presented in China every 5 to 6 years, and we should soon see the successor to the JH-7 fighter bomber, a 5th generation tactical bomber, enter the public square.
In fact, by 2040 and the entry into service of the FCAS and the Tempest, China should have 3 to 4 new generation aircraft, ranging from heavy interceptors to light fighters, including tactical bombers, and will begin the entry into service of the next generation, having accumulated very important technical and tactical skills over the years. We can, therefore, only hope that the profound paradigm shift initiated by Will Roper for the US Air Force, serves as an electric shock at the European level, to take stock of the gap that exists between the strategies and doctrines applied, and those implemented by its competitors and possible adversaries.