Although numerous efforts are being made on both sides of the Rhine to try to find a coherent Modus Operandi between France, Germany and Spain around the FCAS program, the recent twists and turns and difficulties encountered by the program, mainly linked to questions of German politics, risk jeopardizing its future. Under these conditions, what would be the alternatives for each of the stakeholders, in order to respond to the industrial and operational challenges surrounding the FCAS today?
Spain and the return to basics
The case of Spain is, by far, the simplest. Indeed, the country is already planning to equip itself with F35Bs to maintain an onboard naval aviation component and replace its AV8 Matador. Therefore, the simplest alternative for Madrid, and the most likely, would be to join the Tempest program, modeling itself on the Italian and British model, by partially equipping itself with additional F35s and Tempests to replace its F18s and his Matador. Remember that Madrid, like London, Rome and Berlin, is a member of the Eurofighter consortium which produces the Typhoon. Another solution would be based on bilateral cooperation with France in the FCAS, but it would be unlikely if Germany were to withdraw from it, due in particular to the pressures which would undoubtedly arise at the headquarters of the FCAS. NATO. Furthermore, in a case like this, the relative weight of Spain in the program would be much lower than that of France, which would keep all the keys to the program.
Germany between security and renunciation
As for Spain, the most likely hypothesis if Berlin were to withdraw from the FCAS would be a switch to the Tempest program, a hypothesis also supported by many politicians, industrialists and even military personnel across the Rhine. Indeed, German industry was able, during the Tornado and Tempest programs, to develop balanced and even favorable relations with British and Italian industries. But Germany's technological ambitions in the Tempest cannot be at the level of those in the FCAS, due to the presence of more players, and therefore a lower relative weight in the program. We understand why this hypothesis is not favored by Airbus DS, which hopes to make FCAS the transition program allowing it to become a full-fledged military aircraft manufacturer in the field of combat aircraft. On the other hand, Berlin could bet on a significant technological voucher at a lower cost, since BAe like Leonardo, both partners in the F35 program, have developed their skills in key areas such as stealth or data fusion. Additionally, the timing of the Tempest, planned to enter service in 2035, not 2040 like the FCAS, could provide a commercial advantage for replacing early generations of Typhoon, particularly in Saudi Arabia.
Unlike Madrid, German authorities are unlikely to reverse their decision not to acquire F35s, at least as long as the current coalition between the CDU and SPD remains in power. On the other hand, if the German political landscape were to evolve, we can expect to see NATO and the Luftwaffe come back to acquire a few squadrons of the Lockheed aircraft to replace its Tornado, rather than choosing the Typhoon as the current government wishes.
France facing several opportunities
France would appear, at first glance, as the big loser if Germany were to withdraw from the FCAS program. Indeed, the hypothesis of joining the Tempest program would condemn entire sections of technological know-how on the altar of industrial sharing, much more than for the FCAS, about which this problem had already been raised. However, to maintain its industrial know-how and its operational rank, France would still have 3 solutions that are far from devoid of interest:
FCAS Solo
The most obvious solution would be to develop the FCAS program alone, in a rebroadcast of what the programs were Rafale et Typhoon, two devices significantly similar both in appearance and performance, and systematically opposing each other in the few international competitions that the United States, China and Russia deigned to leave to the Europeans. If the development and manufacturing costs, which would obviously be higher if France developed the FCAS alone, will be offset at the level of the State budget by the social and tax revenues generated[efn_note]Principle of La Défense à Valorisation Positive[ /efn_note], the limited volume of devices will significantly limit economies of scale in production, and therefore the competitiveness of the device, like its development cycles.
The international FCAS
The second solution, for France, would be to open its program to countries that do not have a major BITD in terms of aeronautical construction, so as to create a pool of partners and compensate for the departure of Germany. Apart from Spain, countries like Greece, Switzerland and Finland can be considered in Europe, as well as Belgium, even if the latter has chosen the F35. Other countries, particularly Asian, South American or the Middle East, could have an interest in joining the program, such as Malaysia, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates. Like the F35, the FCAS would therefore become not a multi-national but an international program, bringing together a significant number of actors acting as proxies in their sphere of influence. French industry would retain a very important part of the program in terms of study and research, with the partners mainly having an interest in developing industrial production skills.
One of the advantages of such an approach is that it can be established dynamically, without ab initio agreements between all the players. Thus, France could start the program alone, and incorporate foreign industrial partners dynamically over time, according to a previously established and weighted model, like what was done around the NEURON program. By doing so, the program would not face delays due to difficult negotiations. In addition, the volume of devices would be greater, and each player could act within its sphere of influence to promote the offer, rather than having to overlap on overlapping spheres, increasing the likely number of sales to the market. 'export.
The extended FCAS
Third and final solution, France could decide to design a device complementary to the Tempest, while joining the European program. In this hypothesis, the BITD would participate, at a level consistent with industrial sharing between the players, in a merged FCAS/Tempest program, and would develop, in parallel, or slightly upstream, an advanced 5th generation lightweight single-engine aircraft, intended both to promote French know-how in this field since the advent of mirages, and to considerably expand the market addressable for export by the French offer, which will have two different devices in its range.
By proceeding in this way, the French BITD would maintain all the skills necessary for the design of a combat aircraft, while, at the same time, the European BITDs will have locked themselves into a collaborative model prohibiting any individual initiative. In addition, France would regain part of the market lost since the end of the Mirage 2000 chain, and today captive to the F16V, despite Swedish efforts. Because if the Rafale is not within the reach of all budgets, even for many European countries, the FCAS/Tempest will be even less so, as the program is intended to be ambitious. With a lightweight 5th generation device, more advanced and better designed than the F35, but at a higher level compared to the K-FX, T-FX and other J10Ds, the French BITD could rediscover what made its success during the 60s, 70s and 80s.
Conclusion
As we can see, each country has one or more plan Bs, if the FCAS in its current format were to find itself in an impasse. This is perhaps, moreover, one of the causes of the current difficulties, because it is clear that some openly work to favor these plans B, rather than seeking to resolve the obstacles to the main plan. The fact remains that the current formats of the FCAS and Tempest programs tend to generate divergences and difficulties themselves, as the ambitions expressed at the industrial level diverge from the negotiated realities. We can only regret, therefore, the rigidity of the models at the industrial, military and political level, which prevents all the actors of the two programs from designing a coherent and effective approach, at all levels, such as the principle of the extended Scaf.
However, we can wonder if, in France in particular, this myopia is not voluntary, and conditioned by the fear of seeing politicians rush towards the development of a lighter and more economical aircraft, to the detriment of a twin-engine aircraft. medium, as was the case when the French aeronautical industry and the Air Force decided to close the mirage2000 production line so as not to risk seeing national orders for Rafale decrease (which still happened later). The reasoned use of the demonstration of the budgetary return of the Defense investment of the Defense with Positive Valuation doctrine, and the objective analysis of the evolution of threats and operational pressure, should however make it possible to avoid hasty and unfortunate, while preserving the benefits of this original and efficient approach.