A few days ago, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Lecointre, presented his plan so that France can "maintain its rank on the international scene". But what rank are we talking about? Is France still a military power capable of influencing global geopolitics? And if not, can she become so again?
Although associated with the camp of the victorious countries of the Second World War, both because of the pugnacity of General de Gaulle and of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, France nonetheless emerged from the conflict very weakened, to the point of 'to have lost its status as a world power that it had nevertheless held for nearly half a century. The colonial wars and the "Suez affair" put an end to the French and British ambitions to pick up on this leading pack of world powers, in a bipolarized world between the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, upon his return to the head of the country, General de Gaulle undertook to restore to France an international legitimacy, and a real independence of action, by a military nuclear program that many, at the time, considered unrealistic, see Utopian. The fact is, in a little over ten years, France had acquired a nuclear triad, with a fleet of Mirage IV strategic bombers, M4 long-range nuclear missiles on the Albion plateau. , and the entry into service of the first nuclear submarines of the Redoutable class. It also had a panel of tactical nuclear weapons, such as the Pluto ballistic surface-to-surface missile, and the AN-52 bomb capable of equipping the Jaguars of the Air Force as well as the Super-Etendards of the French Navy. . In the context of the early 70s, France had regained its rank as a world power, and its legitimacy to sit as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
The slow erosion of French military and political ambitions
The end of the years of uninterrupted economic growth, called "the glorious thirty", followed by the first and then the second oil shock, led to a slow but irreversible decline in the means allocated by the country to its Defense, and consequently, to its position. on the world stage. Arbitrations began to oppose Defense investments and economic and social investments, to the point that over time, the perception of the army budget slipped, in the minds of politicians and senior officials who advised them, towards a status of “non-productive burden”, devoid of economic and political potential. Defense had ceased to be a major political issue for France...
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the "Post Cold War" period during which many leaders called for taking advantage of the "benefits of peace", amplified this phenomenon, to the point that today, there is a deep feeling, having the value of a political axiom, according to which France can no longer finance military means capable of influencing the course of world events, without the help of its European allies, and especially the United States.
And in the current context of French forces, this is perfectly correct!
Without US logistical and intelligence support, France would not be able to maintain the Barkhane force in the Sahel zone, just as it had not been able to intervene alone in response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in 2014, after the retreat of President Obama's last minute.
The perception today even goes beyond the operational framework, since many politicians justify European cooperation in the field of armaments, as for the FCAS, MGCS and other programs, by the certainty that France “n "no longer has the means to carry out such programs in isolation."
But is this really the case?
For 3 years, the approach of the Positive Valorization Defense doctrine, and the Socle Défense model, have shown that investment in the French Defense ecosystem had significantly greater social, economic and budgetary effects than many attempted economic policies. in vain for decades to resolve unemployment, low growth, or social deficits. Through several articles, we were able to see that France could effectively finance a second aircraft carrier, the combat aircraft necessary to accomplish the missions of the Air Force or the National Navy, or accelerate the HIL program to replace the Gazelle and Lynx helicopters that have been in service for far too long.
But what would it be if the objective was to restore France to a military power bringing it back into the global geopolitical game, capable, as General de Gaulle said, “of choosing its wars, and winning them independently? » ?
What is a world military power?
It would not be enough to apply General de Gaulle's 1960 doctrine of the weak to the strong to make today's France a world military power. The technological and political context has greatly evolved, and although it should not be neglected, nuclear deterrence no longer has the all-powerfulness it had in the 60s and 70s.
To define what a world military power is, it is enough to observe which nations, in the recent past, have managed to achieve this status. The answer to this question is obvious, it is China and Russia.
In the late 80s, China was considered a regional power, technologically backward, economically underdeveloped, and militarily outdated. Today, it has become the obsession of American strategists, who see it as the main threat to their uncontested military power for 30 years. For this, China has on the one hand developed its nuclear triad with modern technologies, but above all, it has built a leading conventional and projection force, sufficient today to represent a proven threat to the island of Taiwan. , ally of the United States.
Russia's journey is even more notable. Totally ruined and disorganized by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the calamitous Yeltsin years, Russia was able, in barely 20 years, to rebuild a military tool which today would be able to challenge the all-powerful NATO, bringing together 5 of the 7 richest countries on the planet. In addition, the country cannot count, like China, on very favorable demographics, nor on decades of very strong industrial growth supported by the West. However, despite its GDP equal to that of Italy, the country has developed an armored force of 2500 modern tanks, an air force of more than 1200 combat aircraft, an autonomous projection and strike capacity which has proven itself in Syria, when everyone considered the power in place to be in agony. In addition, and despite its weak financial resources compared to the United States, it has developed its own breakthrough technologies, hypersonic missiles, stealth fighters and bombers, new generation tanks, etc., again, in complete autonomy. One might think that the country, like the Soviet Union did, would exhaust its resources in defense investment. However, exports of defense equipment today exceed domestic orders, and the final budgetary weight on Russian GDP, once export revenues are deducted, does not exceed 3%, a largely sustainable level for the economy. Russian, even under pressure from Western sanctions.
From these two examples, and from the initial axiom according to which France is not a world military power today, we can deduce the following definition of what a military power is, or must be, to be qualified of world:
- Have a triad nuclear deterrent, evolved, redundant, capable of guaranteeing the destruction of the adversary in the event of an attack
- Have a modern conventional force of sufficient size to protect the territory and, if necessary, guarantee the security of its close allies, against any offensive, even coming from another world powere
- Have sufficient mobilizable power projection capacity to quickly take advantage of a weakly to moderately defended area, and subsequently ensure control, in total autonomy.
Based on this definition, France is not, today, a world military power... this, I hope, will not have surprised anyone.
Why should France become a world military power?
Beyond the enumeration of the objectives to be achieved in order to become a world power, it is still necessary to have the motivation, and therefore to know what the benefits would be for France of producing such an effort presented as extraordinarily costly for the country and its finances. public. And even if, as we will see, this perception of the cost is erroneous, this desire must be strong and anchored because we do not choose to become an actor in global geopolitics for economic and social reasons.
If France must effectively recover its rank, it would be for the same reasons which pushed General de Gaulle to accelerate and strengthen the development of deterrence from 1959. While world geopolitics is in full transformation, it will be a question of guarantee the country, as well as its population, to preserve its security, its political and economic independence, and its independence of action and decision-making on the international scene for decades to come.
Furthermore, a powerful military France could represent the essential anchor point for the emergence of real European independence both in terms of Defense and international policy, therefore freed from the omnipresence of the United States in all decisions and international positions taken by Europe or its members. Because if, today, the Europe of Defense is in all the political declarations, in reality, the European countries are so weak militarily that they would, if necessary, not even be able to oppose alone with Russian military power, a country that is 4 times less populated and 9 times less rich than the European Union. Hence the omnipresence of NATO, and therefore of the United States, in European decisions when it comes to Defense, even when the subject does not fall within the prerogatives of the alliance.
In fact, a militarily strong France would be able to gradually unite Europeans in a factual collective alliance, moving Europe from the status of economic superpower to that of global superpower, joining the United States and China in this status, and which could even become surprisingly attractive for a Russia which will always struggle to reach the demographic and economic thresholds to regain this status or balance the rise of Chinese power.
How to make France a world power?
Now that we have defined the what, and the why, it remains to determine the how, therefore to determine what the format of the French forces, as well as its defense industry, should be to extinguish these objectives. And from this evaluation, we will be able to assess the cost that such an effort would represent for the state budget.
We will break down our analysis into 4 points:
- deterrence
If deterrence has less absolute power than in the past, it nonetheless represents the country's life insurance. To meet the challenges of global power, France should return to a nuclear triad capable of opposing a potential adversary like Russia. It will therefore be necessary to return to a format of 6 SSBNs[efn_note]Nuclear Vehicle Launcher Submarine[/efn_note] so as to permanently have 2 vessels at sea, and one on 24-hour alert and 3 tactical nuclear squadrons, as well as support units essential to this mission. In the evaluation made, we will also take into account the implementation of 2 squadrons of long-range bombers, comparable to American, Chinese, or Russian stealth bombers. Finally, the Army must have regiments of medium-range ballistic missiles, ideally hypersonic, so as to be able to neutralize the threat of a first tactical strike on the nerve centers of the country and its allies.
All of these needs would represent a research and construction effort of €180 to €200 billion over 30 years, or €6 to €6,5 billion per year.
- Land Force
If all armies have experienced significant limitations in resources and formats over the last 30 years, the Army is, by far, the one which has seen its resources the most neglected, to the point of continuing to use VAB armored vehicles[ efn_note]Vehicle of the Armored Front[/efn_note] and gazelle and Puma helicopters from the 80s. It is also the one which will have to increase its format the most to meet the needs of France's new status.
Thus, the Tactical Operational Force must be gradually doubled, with a significant effort to strengthen units capable of supporting high-intensity operations. The operational reserve forces will also have to grow substantially, so as to be able to ensure constant deployment equivalent to 25% of the French operational forces. In addition, the number of armored, tracked and wheeled vehicles, mobile artillery systems, combat helicopters, anti-aircraft and anti-missile protection systems, electronic warfare, communications, intelligence and infovalorization of the battlefield, such as the number of individual combat equipment, will have to increase significantly in accordance with the effective needs of the forces, while the weapon systems themselves will have to be modernized or replaced by new generation systems.
From an equipment point of view, adding related systems and individual equipment, the expense would be €200 billion over 30 years, or €6,5 billion per year.
- The National Navy
The National Navy would evolve so as to meet the effective needs for the protection of French interests throughout its EEZ[efn_note]Exclusive Economic Zone[/efn_note], and to the best of its political and strategic interests. To do this, it will have to have a sufficient number of carrier groups, amphibious groups, high seas fleets, coastal protection flotillas in France and overseas, and all support units, military forces. intervention, and the required naval air assets. Considering the real needs, and the strengthening of the capacities of the navies, air forces and coastal defenses in the world, it would be necessary to multiply by 3 the number of major vessels in service in the French Navy, as well as its naval aviation, representing a expenditure of €250 billion over 30 years, or €8 billion per year, for a format of 70.000 men, including 15% reservists.
- The Air Force
Beyond the squadrons dedicated to deterrence, including tactical and strategic bombers, resupply drones and jamming planes, the Air Force will also have to significantly modify its format. The fighter should be gradually reduced to 500 aircraft, or 25 squadrons. Each combat squadron would also, naturally, have an allocation at least equal to the number of combat drone devices. These devices would support a fleet of aerial refueling aircraft and/or drones, as well as advanced aerial sensing devices and drones. The transport fleet would be sized in proportion to the exact needs for projection of resources consistent with the force projection capabilities of the Army, the Air Force and the National Navy. In the same vein, helicopter fleets, anti-aircraft defense, and the space component will have to grow and be modernized so as to effectively cover the needs of the newly sized national forces. That is, again, a bill of €250 billion over 30 years, and a format of 120.000 men, including 20% reservists.
The sum of the equipment of these 3 armies would therefore represent, including deterrence, a budget of €900 billion over 30 years, or €30 billion per year, this including research, prototyping and production work. The maintenance of this equipment, over 30 years, would represent €450 billion, €15 billion per year, in industrial services external to the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces would be made up of 350.000 active military personnel, and 320.000 operational reservists, i.e. a budget of €25 billion per year, to which is added a €5 billion budget for Defense civilians, and €5 billion per year for infrastructure. .
That is to say a total budget dedicated to the Defense effort of €80 billion per year, representing 3,5% of the country's current GDP.
The values and figures given in this paragraph are for information purposes only, in order to illustrate the potential format of a French army having regained global military potential, and to assess the cost. This is in no way an analysis of the precise needs of the armed forces, which will have to be defined by the General Staff and the political authorities.
How to finance this program of €80 billion per year for 30 years?
The question seems, in fact, more than relevant. For decades, we have repeatedly explained that the State must reduce its spending and get out of debt, this argument having largely served as a justification for the reduction in funds allocated to the Defense effort. To answer this, we will proceed in two stages…
First, we will study the economic effects of this investment in the country. Indeed, one of the unique characteristics of Defense investment is based on its efficiency from an economic point of view, far superior to other State investments. And this for a simple reason: its very low exposure to imports, even in its subcontracting network.
Indeed, according to several field studies, as well as according to the theoretical calculation resulting from the Defense with Positive Valorization doctrine, have shown that investment in the French Defense industry generated on average 10 direct jobs, 7 indirect subcontracting jobs , and 5 induced consumption jobs, per million annual euros invested. However, a job generates known income for the state budget, such as the €22.000 annual average social security contributions, and the €6000 in taxes paid by the employee. Added to this are the savings made in terms of unemployment compensation and the costs of supporting job seekers, on average €24.000 per year for the State, which will no longer be paid if the individual finds a job. job. In fact, the 22 jobs per million euros invested in the Defense industry therefore generate 22×52.000 or €1.144 million per year per million euros invested. And this without taking into account the positive effects of the evolution of French supply on the export market, nor the related effects in terms of debt valuation linked to induced growth.
The €30 billion per year of equipment, and the €15 billion of industrial maintenance costs, deducted from the €20 billion already currently invested in this area, will therefore generate 25.000x 22 = 550.000 jobs, including 200.000 jobs in the national BITD alone . These jobs generated will in turn create €28 billion in budget balance for the State, at a cost of €25 billion, i.e. a very logical “state benefit” of €3 billion per year.
The €30 billion dedicated to defense jobs, an increase of €12 billion compared to the current budget, will generate 150.000 military positions and 20.000 civilian Defense positions. These 170.000 positions will generate a budgetary return rate lower than the industrial rate, the levies varying between systems, and the application of unemployment to young people engaged being less systematic. The overall budgetary return is therefore estimated at 50% of the amount spent, or €6 billion, for 150.000 military positions, 20.000 civilian Defense positions, and 60.000 induced jobs.
Finally, the budget of €5 billion per year essential for the overhaul of military infrastructure will be broken down directly into the acquisition of land (50%), and building and road services, these 50%, representing 50.000 jobs or 2,6 €XNUMX billion budget balance.
In fact, the increase in a Defense effort from €35 billion to €80 billion would lead to:
- an increase in State spending of €45 billion per year
- The creation of 550.000 industrial and civilian jobs
- The creation of 150.000 military positions and 20.000 civilian Defense positions,
- The creation of 50.000 jobs linked to infrastructure work throughout the territory
- The creation of a budget balance of €40 billion
That is to say an effective annual cost of only €5 billion, to move from the status of a declining regional power to the status of a rising global power, while reducing unemployment by 35%. Note, once again, that the increase in investments in the Defense industry, like the increase in French military power on the international scene, will mechanically increase the attractiveness of the supply of French Defense equipment on the the international scene, with, as a result, budgetary revenues very probably higher than the additional cost of €5 billion per year identified.
The socio-economic and political effects induced
The data used are based on several regional study reports, and developed in the form of a doctrine, Defense with Positive Valorization. But, beyond the direct effects observed, numerous indirect and induced effects, more difficult to model, will surround the implementation of such a program. Thus, the creation of more than 200.000 industrial jobs will generate the emergence of several dozen industrial centers, to which will be added the hundred military bases to open or re-open throughout the territory to absorb the 150.000 additional military personnel. The potential in terms of regional planning is, obviously, very important, with significant political effects as a result.
Alongside State investments, manufacturers, faced with a firm equipment plan structured over time, will also be able to invest, both in the training of recruited personnel and in new industrial infrastructures, acting as a multiplier coefficient. of state investment during the first 10 years. These investments, and the newfound financial power of French Defense groups, will act as a powerful lever to promote the national BITD[efn_note]Defence Industrial and Technological Base[/efn_note] in Europe, so as to consolidate the European BITD, under conditions favorable.
Finally, the new equipment offered, such as modernized production capacities, and the country's military power, will significantly improve the attractiveness of French defense equipment on the international scene, even in the face of the United States or China. Taking into account the DVP[efn_note]Positive Valorization Defense[/efn_note] doctrine could even give a very significant competitive advantage to French export manufacturers, with very attractive financing models and prices.
From a political point of view, in addition to the national momentum given by such an ambition, the reduction in unemployment combined with very significant induced growth and the elimination of social deficits, as well as the effects of visible territorial planning, will calm the discontent partly social, especially since unaccounted revenues, such as those linked to exports, could be attributed to the reduction in levies. All of these points could even, in a favorable international context, contribute to improving the solvency of the national debt, and therefore to lowering its cost on public finances. Conversely, in the case of an economic crisis, these various economic and social strengths could strengthen French resilience in the face of other countries, acting as a pole of stability where other countries face serious difficulties.
Conclusion
As we have seen, France has the means, at least financial, to regain its status as a military power with a determining role in world geopolitics. It is, in this respect, interesting to note that the difficulties and limitations of the model presented relate much more to recruitment and training issues, both for manufacturers and the military, than to the budgetary and financial model, although presented for decades as the restrictive element justifying the reduced format of French Defense today. Certain models, such as the Defense Base, provide, as such, solutions to address these recruitment and training difficulties, as well as to facilitate the start of such a program without negative impact on the State's budgetary balances.
In any case, from now on, France could, and should, increase its defense investments so as to regain sufficient military and industrial power to defend its interests, and to give substance to Defense Europe. All that remains is, to achieve this, to agree to ask the right questions, to have the desire to provide applicable and effective answers...