That China is developing a powerful deep-sea navy is no longer a surprise to anyone. We know that, in 2025, The People's Liberation Army Navy will have exceeded the sum of all European navies, and in 2035, if it respects its current production rate, it will have caught up with the US Navy.
It should be noted that only 5 years ago, putting forward the hypothesis that a world power would be able to catch up with the US Navy in 20 years would have left all specialists on the subject more than skeptical. Today, the debate centers not on China's ability to catch up with American naval power by 2035, but on its willingness, or not, to do so. The most Sinophiles believe that China will not seek to extend its power of intervention beyond its Silk Road project. In this case, its Navy will be limited to 6 or 7 aircraft carriers, or 2 per fleet (North, East, South) and possibly a spare vessel to maintain capacity during periodic unavailability (1 ½ years every 10 years, i.e. 1 spare for 6 buildings in the running).
For the most pessimistic, China has no intention of limiting itself to the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and intends to develop a fleet capable of protecting its interests on all the oceans and seas of the planet. The size of the Chinese production tool, capable of producing 2 aircraft carriers per 5 years, tends to support this hypothesis, with a format evolving between 12 and 14 buildings, depending on whether they are kept for 30 or 35 years. Beyond the aircraft carriers themselves, the production of escort ships, essential to the carrier group, also respects this format, with on average 3 to 4 destroyers, 4 frigates, 1 nuclear attack submarine and 1 tanker. refueler per year.
It would be unlikely that after 8 or 10 years of sustained production, as currently, Chinese industry would suddenly be forced to move to a “slow” mode, focused only on the replacement of buildings, as in the West. This would imply that a lean period of at least 10 years would await the Chinese shipyards, whereas it would have been much simpler to smooth out production over 30 years, so as to maintain a constant load plan, and to be able to optimize the maintenance and development of industrial skills.
The authorities of the Middle Empire are experts at muddying the waters, and making their objectives obscure until the last moment. But the analysis of purely industrial data, given the formidable current effort to develop a modern and efficient shipbuilding infrastructure, the hypothesis of very great Chinese ambitions in naval matters indeed has a lot of credibility.
In the history of human societies, there have never been two great naval powers that coexisted peacefully. In the case of two naval superpowers like China and the United States by 2035, the prospects are worrying to say the least.
However, if the United States is forced to put all its forces into a hypothetical conflict against China, what will remain of NATO's capacity to strengthen in the event of tensions on European territory?