The Sri Lankan authorities have reportedly ceded a 99-year concession to a Chinese company to the operation of the port of Hambantota, at the southern tip of the peninsula, and therefore in direct proximity to the Indian provinces of Kerala and Pondicherry. This announcement follows those concerning the opening of a Chinese naval base in the Maldives, and Chinese bases in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The Indian government has expressed concern that this civil concession will be used by Chinese Navy vessels, further locking India into the Pearl necklacewhich constitutes the multiple Chinese naval and air bases which have been established in the Indo-Pacific zone in recent years. In the Pacific, it was the Australian and New Zealand authorities who expressed their concern about discussions initiated between the Chinese authorities and representatives of the island of Vanuatu to deploy a naval base there, just 2000 km from the Australian coast.
If the Sino-Indian rivalry has mainly been dealt with from the land aspect in recent years, with the repeated frictions between the armies of the two countries on the Doklham plateau, it is the naval aspect which represents the most strategic issue for India.
Indeed, today, India has almost no allies on its borders, while it has no shortage of adversaries, first and foremost the Sino-Pakistani alliance. Furthermore, its most powerful continental ally, the Russian Federation, seems to be gradually turning away from it and moving closer to China, and more surprisingly, to Pakistan.
In fact, access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans represents a vital issue for the world's leading democracy, as it is the only remaining line of communication in the event of conflict. And it is from this point of view that the announcement concerning the port of Hambantota alerts the authorities and the Indian Naval Staff. In isolation, this announcement may not be of consequence, although this port is strategically placed to control transfers between the two oceans. But put into perspective the announcements concerning naval bases in Pakistan, in the Maldives, and at Bangladesh, it appears that they are able to create a naval blockade of all Indian ports.
On the other hand, the opening of Chinese naval bases is always accompanied by significant economic investments in the local and national economy of the host country, increasing its economic dependence on China, and strengthening Chinese control over its political authorities. . Thus, Bangladesh, like Nepal, recently signed defense and military cooperation agreements with Beijing.
Finally, the Chinese Navy now has the necessary and sufficient forces to deploy in these ports, with ships whose military power is not symbolic, creating important points of support to block a large part of the commercial routes transiting in The area. These points themselves rely on the multiple air and naval bases on Chinese territory as well as in the China Sea, now entirely under the control of Beijing, despite what international authorities say.
India is trying to react, and announced last month the signing of an agreement with the authorities of the islands of Seychellesto also establish a naval base there. But above all, we can make a direct link between this situation and the urgent need expressed by the Indian Navy to helicopter carrier assault ships, like the French BPC Mistral, such ships being essential for carrying out assaults by sea. An announcement that echoes that made by the Japanese authorities concerning the creation of an amphibious brigade, a first since the end of the Second World War, anticipating a “leapfrogging” strategy put in place by Admiral Nimitz during the Pacific War.