Several MPs have pointed out the shortcomings affecting the French armies today., on the occasion of parliamentary discussions in committee, surrounding the 2025 budget.
Several amendments and parliamentary reports have thus highlighted the gap that is emerging in the years to come between the theoretical format of the armies, defined by the Strategic Review of 2022, and validated by the Military Programming Law 2024-2030, and the reality of the inventories that will be available to the armies over this period.
Thus, in several highly critical areas, such as the fleet of combat aircraft, frigates, nuclear attack submarines, or even combat tanks, the French armies will be chronically under-equipped during the execution of the LPM, in a period which will certainly prove to be one of the most tense in recent history, on the international scene.
Worse still, the theoretical format, which the armies will only partially achieve, on the upcoming LPM, is identical to that developed in 2013, by the Ayrault government, with a stated desire to reduce the armies to their strict minimum, in a geopolitical context radically different from what it is today.
In this section:
The major impasses of the 2024-2030 LPM resurface in the National Assembly
While discussions are lively at the Palais Bourbon, as part of the vote on the 2025 State budget, several deputies have, through the amendments tabled and their parliamentary reports, pointed out significant capacity deficits, which will affect the French armed forces in the next few years, in particular with regard to compliance with the capacity format defined by the 2022 Strategic Review.
The Air and Space Force will certainly not have 185 fighters until 2030
This is particularly the case of the RN deputy of Var, Franck Giletti, very active within the Defense Commission, of which he is one of the vice-presidents. He has, in fact, filed an amendment concerning the measures to be adopted to enable the Air Force's fighter fleet to field the 185 combat aircraft planned for the entire duration of the LPM, and not just in 2030.
In fact, the Air Force must receive, in the next 5 years, 42 Rafale additional. These will replace the 24 Rafale sold second-hand to Greece and Croatia, and replace the withdrawal of the Mirage 2000-5 and a dozen of the 60 Mirage 2000Ds currently in service, which will not be modernized in order to be extended until 2035.
However, Paris has just confirmed the anticipated dispatch of 6 Mirage 2000-5s to Ukraine in 2025, while the Air Force recorded the tragic loss of two aircraft this year. Rafale, following a mid-air collision.
Since the latter has no operational room for maneuver, nor any reserves, to absorb these levies, it is very likely that they will bring the format of the French fighter fleet below the threshold of 185 aircraft over the period 2025-2030, even if the format in 2030 should be brought back to this level, with 137 Rafale and 48 modernized Mirage 2000Ds.
The French Navy will remain under the 15 first-rank frigates until 1
The problem is the same for the frigates, submarines and patrol boats of the French Navy. Thus, after the cancellation of the order for the last five FREMMs of the Aquitaine class, and their replacement by the development of the FDI frigates of the Amiral Ronarc'h class, the French Navy had to quickly undertake the modernization of three of its FLF Lafayette class, to equip them with a sonar, in particular, in order to make them first-rank frigates.
There are 75% of this article left to read, Subscribe to access it!
The Classic subscriptions provide access to
articles in their full version, and without advertising,
from €1,99. Subscriptions Premium also allow access to archives (articles over two years old)
Christmas promotion : 15% discount on Premium and Classic subscriptions annual with the code MetaXmas2024, from 11/12 to 27/12 only.
Thanks for the article. Regarding the air force, I believe that a batch of 40 Rafale is being delivered (4T2 tranche), including 12 in 2023, 13 hoped for in 2024, 14 announced for 2025, and I imagine 1 in 2026. Some have arrived at Orange. Will they not, in practice, compensate for the departure of 2000-5 to Ukraine and the non-modernized 2000Ds?
The 2000-5s were due to be retired in 2028. So by 2030 we would have 137 Rafale and 48 2000D. Since then, however, both have been lost Rafale during the collision. In addition, current deliveries are planned to compensate for the withdrawal of the 2000C, and to replace the 24 Rafale delivered to Greece and Croatia. The problem is therefore that it is quite possible that over the period 2025-2028, the 6 Mirage 2000-5 sent to Ukraine have not yet been replaced by the planned delivery of the Rafale, because in the current model, we do not go “above” 185; Everything is calculated to stay on the edge. And therefore, the slightest variation is directly felt on the park actually available.
Ah okay "on the wire" indeed, and that also explains why we went from 55 to 48 RMV. Apothecary accounts...
How is the figure of 180 billion euros calculated?
Sum of (2,2% – real defense effort) x current GDP since 2013
or (6.8% x €2639 billion) = €179,5 billion based on 2022 GDP.
Thank you for your reply.
"We need to move to war economy mode for the defense industry"
Ah yes, I only understand now: this quote does not apply to the French army.
France never became a war economy. That's right. The United States spent 10% of its GDP during the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union spent over 15% of its GDP on military spending throughout the Cold War. Britain's defense effort in 1944 exceeded 50% of its GDP. Ukraine invests 35% of its GDP in its military today. Russia, with over 12%, does not claim the status of a war economy, but an economy at war...
To say that France, with its 2%, is in a war economy is... how to say... insulting to those who really do it.
The end is not readable even when connected
Yes, in fact it was the tag that prevented non-subscribers from reading the article, which was badly placed. Thank you, I was able to rectify the situation.
In this case, let them draw the necessary conclusions: the Euro was seen as a way to maintain social benefits at high levels, not to ensure the country's defense or to have a strong industry. It worked perfectly in this sense, French industry was divided by 2, social benefits remained very high. The next step is either to cut social spending and invest only where it is necessary, or to leave the euro and do it in a monetary way (as before). The others will not pay for us. In short, either pay the banker by cutting spending, which will frustrate those who contribute, or we steal the banker's money via maximum inflation (we maintain benefits facially but we empty them of value/GDP). There are not 50 solutions, but 2. The debate is constantly postponed, for no gain, no decision, with a worsening of the situation. It is terribly disappointing. We will not have an army without this decision. No party, through electoralism, wants to move forward. It is making us a Milei.
There are intermediate models that would allow for increased defense investments without increasing deficits.
In my opinion, this is where, and this alone, salvation lies.
Leaving the Euro today, under current conditions, would lead to a sudden drop in the purchasing power of the French, a disastrous inflationary crisis, and a political and institutional collapse, very far from the desired objectives.
Let's not forget that if the French armies lack resilience, today, this is much more the case for civil society...