NO! Deterrence is not shared.
This is probably, in essence, the answer that a majority of readers will have in mind when approaching this article, and even more so those who limit themselves to the title. However, the subject was raised, very directly, by the former European Commissioner Thierry Breton, interviewed on November 7 on LCI on this subject.
It is certainly necessary, beyond the knee-jerk reactions that such a statement may trigger, to question the reasons that led Thierry Breton, who is very familiar with European issues, to make such an assertion, and the way in which France, and perhaps Great Britain, could replace the American nuclear shield in Europe, if necessary.
In this section:
Europeans are concerned about a change in the United States' posture towards NATO and the American nuclear shield in Europe, with the election of Donald Trump
Since the victory of Donald Trump and the Republican Party proved so inevitable and incontestable on the night of 5-6 November, a certain wind of panic has risen in European chancelleries.
Apart from the Hungarian Viktor Orban, who is pursuing his own agenda, everyone in Europe has felt a deep concern about the various statements made by candidate Trump, during the presidential campaign.
The latter has, in fact, repeatedly threatened to withdraw the protection offered by the United States to countries which " would not pay their dues", to ensure their own defense. Later, this one fixed at a defense effort of 3% of GDP, which he considered to be "due", while only four European countries, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Greece, already respect this objective, and five NATO members (Spain, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Belgium, Canada and Italy), are still below the 1,5% mark.
In addition to the threats to US protection of Europeans, the speech given by the new American President-elect during the campaign suggests a halt to American aid to Ukraine, to force Kyiv to negotiate with Moscow, on the basis of the current territorial gains of the Russian armies, which would constitute a huge de facto victory for the Kremlin in this conflict.
The effectiveness of this American shield has already been considerably weakened by the statements of the new American president.
However, beyond the possible withdrawal of American forces from certain European countries, linked to defense spending deemed insufficient by the president, these repeated challenges to the United States' commitment to NATO and its European allies, as well as the probable abandonment of Ukraine by Washington, while the country is required, by the Budapest Memorandum, to protect the territorial integrity of the country, already constitute a considerable weakening of the effectiveness of NATO's deterrence posture, especially with regard to Russia.
So, for Moscow, it appears that Washington's perceived commitment to protect its allies is, in reality, primarily transactional, meaning that Russia may have some options, also transactional, to get the United States to disengage, as in Ukraine, giving free rein to the Kremlin's territorial appetites.
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Will the principle of cost sharing remain? Today, Germany and Italy invest their entire budget in their conventional weapons, while we must invest a good part of our budget in nuclear weapons (SNLE submarines, Rafales dedicated), plus maintenance of operational weapons
This is indeed a topic. Let's say that the article focuses on dealing with the emergency. After that, we will have time (and a relatively advantageous position) to negotiate, for example, the exclusion of investment deterrence from the budget deficit. Let's keep in mind that the United States does not officially ask anything from NATO members to be "protected".
If it serves the destiny of France, of course it is shared. We must at all costs impose ourselves as the leader of Europe to the detriment of the spiked helmets.
The General…………always the General……….never forget the General.
Hello, I am absolutely not a Trump supporter and if I were American I probably wouldn't have voted for him. That said, when he says that Europeans don't pay enough for their defense, I agree with him!
General de Gaulle had already taken over the reins of our defense in the 60s and we have injected hundreds of billions into it. Today we are able to hold our own against anyone. That said, sharing, yes, why not, and will the Europeans agree to share the sums invested by our country in this deterrence? Some countries that I will not name are lecturing us on our deficits, but I would like to know if there is a calculation of what our deterrence has cost us over the past 60 years. Afterwards, we will ask them to share in proportion to the number of inhabitants of each country. In any case, the Germans will never agree to come under the French and English umbrella. So we can always talk about it...
Have you read this article? https://meta-defense.fr/2023/12/08/politique-defense-de-d-trump-pour-2024/
Yes, thank you, but a reminder doesn't hurt.
It would be good if our governing bodies read it too in case they are not informed...
Deterrence is not shared. Yes. If only because France's vital interests extend beyond European territory (this is just as true for the British).
More precisely, the "decision to exercise deterrence" is not shared. It is a clear and distinct element of the sovereignty of the French state (which is why a European deterrence has very little chance of emerging).
On the other hand, the notion of deterrence extended to the European territory (it is de facto although the contours are deliberately vague) or of "reassurance" in the form of the double key on the US model could be considered as a substitute (or in addition?) to the American umbrella. Beyond the political question (and the message addressed to the Americans), there remains the technical and thorny question of the carriers (aircraft / effectors), their financing, etc. We must also be clear on one point: nuclear deterrence also relies on conventional deterrence, the two work together.
the two aspects are complementary (nuclear and conventional deterrence) are complementary, however, they are not equal. Quite simply by the fact that only two countries, in Europe, have a nuclear deterrent, and that nuclear weapons outclass conventional weapons without a fight, when they are not neutralized by deterrence. However, today, if the Europeans, outside FR/UK, can hope to stand up to Russia from a conventional point of view, without deterrence, it is almost a lost cause.
And if Ukraine is still resisting, it is first and foremost because the United States, France, Great Britain and China have directly threatened Moscow if nuclear weapons were to be used in Ukraine.
So, deterrence is the necessary foundation, without which we cannot build an ambitious military alliance and a security pact. As a corollary, without this nuclear foundation, Europe will collapse in a few months.
Ukraine has the capacity to design a nuclear vector fairly quickly, between their expertise in civil nuclear power and the presence of Ukrainian researchers who participated in the development of Russian nuclear vectors in the 80s/90s.