The construction of the Hunter-class frigates has just received a second tranche of funding, announced by Australian authoritiesIn line with the recommendations of the Australian Strategic Review 2024, this program, initially of 9 ships for $35 billion, has been reduced to only 6 units, while a new class of 11 multi-purpose frigates, more compact and less expensive, will soon be ordered to complete the modernization of the Royal Australian Navy.
The surprise comes from the amount of this second tranche, $19,87 billion, after a first of $18,35 billion, already invested, for a total budget of $38,3 billion, for only 6 ships, against $35 billion planned, but for nine frigates.
Above all, the cost price per ship will then reach 6,4 billion Australian dollars, or 4 billion euros, two to four times more expensive than the average price of Western frigates, including the US Navy's Constellation class, for ships with performances and characteristics very close to those of the future Hunters.
Have such deviations already been observed in Australia? And if so, in the context of a non-cyclical, and more recurrent problem, how can we explain such differences in cost prices, which should nevertheless alert both the political class and the Australian public?
In this section:
Budget slippage accusations that dug the grave of Australia's Barracuda Attack-class submarines
In France, we still remember very well the incessant attacks by the Australian press against Naval Group, concerning the SEA 1000 program and its 12 Attack class submarines.
At that time, many of the country's tabloids accused the French industrialist of not controlling the budget and the provisional schedule initially presented, passing over in silence the fact that in the meantime, the number of ships had increased from 8 to 12, and that the figures put forward covered a very different scope from that initially negotiated.
These repeated accusations created the favourable context which allowed Prime Minister Scott Morrison to negotiate in great secrecy with Washington and London, the SSN-AUKUS program, and to announce to a public opinion cooked to perfection, the cancellation of the Barracuda contract, to turn towards American-British nuclear-powered submarines.
Analysis of the data concerning the accusations of budgetary slippage against Naval Group shows, in hindsight, that the French industrialist had, on the contrary, made very significant efforts to contain this drift, beyond the homothetic increase linked to the change of format, and that the forecast budget presented just a few days before Scott Morrison's unilateral cancellation corresponded well to the initial commitments made.
A$40 billion for a fleet of 6 Type 26 Hunter-class frigates for the Royal Australian Navy
This was also the case for another major program, also intended for the Royal Australian Navy, and launched shortly after the SEA-1000 program. On the basis of a report commissioned from the Rand Corporation, and submitted in 2016, the Australian authorities launched a call for tenders for the local construction of nine modern frigates, intended to replace the Anzac-class frigates.
The budget, then framed, was 35 billion Australian dollars, or less than 22 billion euros, for a price per ship already more than comfortable 2,45 billion euros, or the price of an American destroyer of the Arleigh Burke class.
It was the British BAe system, with the new Type 26 frigate, recently ordered by the Royal Navy, which prevailed over offers from Navantia (F-5000) and Fincantieri (FREMM Modifiée). Its selection was announced in June 2018. The ship was to, among other things, integrate a new AESA radar of national design, the American AEGIS combat system, and an interface designed by the Swedish Saab. In doing so, the Hunter class was to be " one of the most capable combat ships on the planet", according to Australian authorities.
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Thanks for the analysis Fabrice. It is quite sad to see Australia (which remains an ally country, despite the somewhat stormy relations with France since the AUKUS affair) make such choices in terms of defense industry. So much Australian taxpayer money wasted… for the sole benefit of Anglo-Saxon industrial giants.
In the same vein, it would be interesting to take a look at Canadian naval armament programs in recent years. There too, we have seen ship acquisitions at staggering costs and quite shameful prices…
In Canada, what concerns me the most, if the difference between the programs and the numbers of the armies. I do not see at all how they will arm their 12 submarines, 15 frigates and 18 patmar… Canada has chosen an aircraft that tops out at Mach 1.6, which struggles, in fact, to maintain supersonic flight in level flight, which only carries 4 AMRAAM missiles, and which requires very heavy maintenance, while its need requires exactly the opposite, and that they should have favored either an interceptor, like the Typhoon, or the F-15, a high-performance multi-role aircraft, such as the Gripen, the Super Hornet or the Rafale.
At the same time, the army does not even have self-propelled 155 mm guns or air defense.
This doesn't make any sense at all.
But hey, like in Australia, apparently it suits Canadians just fine.
Well, if it goes sour, they will order equipment from France and from all available shipyards, urgently. We will manufacture, they will lose their country and we will have new boats to resell to another country. This is what happened with the planes that we had ordered from the USA and that we could not receive because of the debacle. The British took advantage of it.