By its characteristics, and its advances, the Rafale F5 is getting closer to a Super programRafale, like what the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet will have been for the F/A 18 Hornet, and will represent a major step in the evolution of the French fighter.
The device will, in fact, have a renewed information processing and communication capacity, allowing it to control and interact with combat drones. This was done, the Rafale F5 will be able to set a foot in the famous 6th generation of combat aircraft, which is currently being built around the SCAF, GCAP or NGAD programs in the West.
However, by imposing the same cell and other limitations linked to iterative evolution, the Rafale F5 will not truly be able to take the generational step, even if its operational characteristics will be transformed, and very close to the effectiveness of 5th generation fighters like the F-35, the J-20 or the Su-57.
The question therefore arises if, beyond the Rafale F5 for 2030, France should not develop, by 2035, a real Super-Rafale, able to make the operational, technological and commercial junction with the SCAF program, both to preserve the effectiveness of the French air and naval forces, particularly those involved in deterrence, and to preserve its dominant position on the combat aircraft market, in the world.
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The transformation of the air forces which is looming from 2030
Only a year ago, the transformation of fighter aviation that would result from the arrival of 6th generation combat aircraft, such as the NGF of the SCAF, or the Tempest of the GCAP, was not envisaged before by 2045 or 2050, significantly.
In addition, some of these programs, such as GCAP or NGAD, aimed more at designing a new combat aircraft, for the 2030s, than a real system of systems, the latter only having to enter service afterward, from of 2040, the expected arrival date for the SCAF system of systems and its NGF combat aircraft.
In short, if the trajectories were different between Western programs, the finish line remained the same, with a real first significant operational capability not expected to arrive before 2045 or 2050.
The suspension of the US Air Force NGAD program, announced by its Secretary, Frank Kendall, a few days ago, could well sweep away, and accelerate, this timetable. He, in fact, indicated that the program was suspended, until an indefinite date, the time for the USAF to determine if the paradigms around which it was designed, were still valid and adapted to the needs which are now emerging. .
Officially, this reflection is conditioned by budgetary questions, linked to the explosion in the costs of several concomitant programs, such as the LGM-39A ICBM to replace the Minutemann III, whose forecast costs have increased from $77,7 to $140 billion. in a few years.
However, at the same time, the US Air Force has indicated that it intends prioritize the development of its combat drones, in particular to respond to the changing balance of power in the Pacific, facing Taiwan.
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The SCAF must also be considered as a coalition project which, if it ever exists, will only have commercial reality within the framework of this alliance, and therefore almost impossible to export (cf: the export success of the Typhoon), so the Super Rafale would be the real alternative for the continuation of the commercial success of the Rafale. The F35 risks becoming the F104 Starfighter of the 21st century, a commercial success within the framework of NATO but a technical failure. Dassault will have to believe in its star and launch the project with or without a government order, perhaps using the club Rafale.
I think that in France we need to stop seeing the F-35 as a failure. The plane still has problems, that's a fact, and it's also very expensive. That said, having discussed it in several air forces in Europe, no one regrets having turned to this fighter, from the pilot to the general. The two arguments put forward are always the same, a stealthy mini Awacs, and the cooperative commitment, which makes it the only aircraft on the market with a real chance of challenging the Russian integrated air defense (according to them).
We end up convincing ourselves that the success of the F-35 is only due to an immense conspiracy of Washington and Lockheed, and a sign of submission to the United States. This is a very reductive analysis. Above all, it leads us straight into the wall, the day when the United States opens the floodgates on the export of the fighter.
If Dassault became Dassault, it is because it was able to offer an interceptor fighter, the Mirage III, close in performance to the F-104, but as flexible to use as the F-4, and less expensive than both.
If he had stuck with the Mystere IV, relying on the certainty that the aircraft was already efficient, and not American, Dassault would have joined Fiat, Fokker, De Havilland in the graveyard of the late European aircraft manufacturers.
Attention, I am very happy with the international success of the Rafale, which is an excellent aircraft. But let's not kid ourselves: this success is due, in large part, to Washington's refusal to export the F-35 to these countries (except for Greece and Croatia, which could have bought only F-35s). It is therefore necessary to very quickly anticipate the arrival of the F-35 on a wider market, and to propose, just as quickly, a real "5G", as an alternative to the American stealth fighter (if possible, better and less buggy)
More or less the specifications of the Galium Nitride radar, multistatic detection and LiDAR communications, minus the stealth. But given the expected performance and developments of radars, is it not better to only increase the range of weapons, in order to, if not to be seen, give yourself more time to hide or flee? The SU-57 or the J20 will look smart if its stealth is useless. Missile against missile, that's all.
From my point of view, stealth is a bit like a second engine. You can do without it, it's a bit more expensive, but in the end, it would be a shame to do without it, especially on a device of this size. In addition, I think it is a powerful prerequisite on the export scene.
I fear that time is running out for us more than your analysis suggests. The relaxation of restrictions on F35 exports and the competition you cite from other 5th generation projects could have a brutal and rapid impact on the currently very strong demand for the Rafale.
It might be wise, although there are many reasons that make it difficult to have a first prototype of an initial version of the Super Rafale on the horizon planned for the F5, if necessary as a replacement for the F5. This would require a considerable effort from the State, as well as a risk-taking by Dassault Aviation comparable to that of the Mirage 4000…
I think the decision has already been made. No one has any interest in closing the tap of orders that has been opened so hard. We are talking here about an evolution of the cell, to meet the needs of what the cell of Rafale does not cover. The Indians will soon manufacture the plane. The MMRCA should have a Safran engine co-developed with India with 110 KN thrust. France pays for radar upgrades. Dassault is not going to grow. I am not in the good books, but hey. I imagine they will launch something. What we want from the SCAF remains difficult to understand.
The cell seems to me to be the priority axis to improve the electrical power and stealth while maintaining the flight qualities and the carrying capacity. I hope that the development is well underway…
Oh no, he's not. But he should be.
I am not sure I fully understand Dassault's involvement in the “commercial failures” of Morocco, the Netherlands and Brazil, which seem to me to be linked more to the incompetence of public administrations or political power: The Moroccan failure is the result of lobbying by Bercy who did everything to ensure that the favorable financial conditions requested by Rabat were not granted to it, some poorly concealing their masochistic Algerian tropism (this did not start with MM Hollande and Macron) ; the Netherlands was an almost impossible case given the links between this country and not only the USA but also the US military-industrial complex – remember the Lockeed corruption affair which did not cut the existing close links; As for Brazil, we must remember to thank Mr. Sarkozy who offended Brazilian national pride and President Lula by announcing an agreement that did not exist in the minds of the so-called buyers...
I in no way want to advocate for Dassault which has no need of my verve but there is among certain people - not you of course - a tendency towards Dassault Bashing which should not be encouraged..
Dassault is a firm which has always brought honor to France and which has always loyally played its role within the framework of the “strategic and moral contract” which links it to the State, like Elf-Aquitaine in another era.
To return to commercial "failures" - in this area politics counts more than commercial or technical matters - then came the American strategic error and the anger of the marshal, very well exploited by the talent of Mr. Le Drian - he had it - and those close to him
As for Mr. Morin, it is reasonable to think that he was one of the worst Ministers of Defense of all the Republics, being joined in incompetence and short-sightedness only by these high-ranking members of the Navy and the ' Aeronavale who did not want the Rafale...
France's problem - but you will retort that this is the case for all States - is the highly variable degree of competence of its Defense officials, both civil and military.
But since 1871 and from war to war, citizens interested in history and military matters have learned to fear the worst.
But to return to your article, I imagine that the leaders of Dassault share your analyzes and proposals and have, if not forgotten, at least digested the disappointment of the Mirage 4000..
Sincerely