On the occasion of the last Eurosatory exhibition, two French equipment attracted particular attention: the Caesar MkII and the Leclerc Evolution, both presented by KNDS France, formerly Nexter.
Indeed, these two land combat systems synthesize, in a way, all the potential that French engineering can bring in terms of land combat, by being at the same time mobile, efficient and innovative, while not giving in to the hypertechnologism which sometimes affects this sector, and thus offer very attractive prices, at least for the Caesar MkII, since the price of the Leclerc Evolution has not been mentioned.
However, the fate of these two pieces of equipment could be very different. Indeed, where the Army has already ordered 109 Caesar MK2s to form the backbone of its mobile artillery in the years to come, the Leclerc Evolution has not seemed to generate interest. the interest of the general staff, nor of the DGA and the Ministry of the Armed Forces, bound by budgetary constraints and programs to be completed.
Therefore, if the Caesar MkII has already started its international career, in Belgium and Lithuania, the new tank from KNDS France seems, today, destined to enrich the long lists of high-value equipment, promised for a career exceptional international, but cut down before even having started in their momentum, by questionable considerations.
Indeed, as we will see, Leclerc Evolution not only has the potential to restore to the Army the firepower and maneuver during fierce symmetrical engagements, as well as the mass allowing it to support in the duration of such a commitment.
It also has, in front of it, an international market, addressable by France, more than considerable with 8936 tanks to replace in the world, which is only waiting for a helping hand, let's say rather from the forearm, from the Ministry of the Armed Forces, to be effectively canvassed.
In this section:
With 200 modernized Leclercs, the Army can only partially fulfill its commitments to NATO
In a previous article, we showed that the French fighter format, aiming to provide the Air Force with 185 combat aircraft, and the Naval Air Force with 40 aircraft, fell far short of needs, in particular with regard to the commitments made by France to NATO.
The same 2013 White Paper, at the origin of the combat aviation format, also decided to reduce the Army's combat tank fleet to 200 examples, among other things. However, this format is barely enough to effectively arm two “heavy” brigades, the very ones which are at the heart of a potential engagement in Central Europe.
The fact is, Paris has also committed, vis-à-vis NATO, to deploy at the request of the Alliance, a division of two brigades and 12 to 15 men, forming a division, and the command capabilities to lead the army corps in the South European theater, around Romania and Bulgaria.
With six organic brigades, subject to some delay, this objective seemed realistic to French planners. However, in this organization chart, only two brigades were classified as heavy, while two brigades, called medium, were similar to motorized infantry brigades. The last two, called light, were made up of Marine infantry units, the Legion, airborne and mountain troops.
Since then, the war in Ukraine has shown that it was very risky, not to say suicidal, to engage motorized infantry troops, or even light troops, without having the support of heavy armored vehicles and artillery. , and therefore battle tanks. Furthermore, the attrition observed is such that the absence of reserves, including at divisional level, can quickly prove catastrophic.
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Thank you for this analysis which seems reasonable, hoping that the general staff and Bercy will hear you.
Despite everything, you are placing yourself within the framework of a massive order equivalent to the current fleet, but what about the impact of an order of 25 to 50 models max? Wouldn’t this be a boost for the launch on the export market? Even if it takes an increase if it takes?
thank you in advance
This is exactly what the Germans are doing with the initial order of 18 Leopard 2A8 for the Bundeswehr, the tank was barely made public, and it worked very well. However, for them it was a matter of replacing the 18 Leopard 2A6 sent to Ukraine. In our case, with less than 60 tanks, to arm a regiment, I don't really see the point.
Hello,
In the case that you are proposing an order of 60 units, what would be the actual cost and what are the possible financing options (extension/postponement of the Scorpion program, etc.)?
If the launch of an order could ultimately bring in export markets, the revenues would partly compensate for the investment as you indicate….
Thank you in advance.
Taking into account R&D, I would say €1 billion. The funding cannot be found in the LPM, which is already at full capacity. This is why it is necessary, in this case, to turn to financing models outside of LPM, as mentioned in this article: https://meta-defense.fr/2024/08/02/programmes-industriels-de-defense-lpm24/
There is still a point of consistency to be had. On the one hand, France has acquired equipment that seems expensive for its real combat function (evolution of the price of weapons equipment since 1970) and on the other, relaunching the production of a fairly expensive tank when we see that mass perhaps pays more than technology.
I really like your willpower and appreciate your work more than anything, but how do you plan to resolve this contradiction?
I completely agree with you. Moreover, if it were a question of making an MBT from A to Z, my perception is precisely that it would be necessary to make a lighter tank, of the order of 45 tons, less expensive, and which relies on APS, on mobility and on discretion to ensure its survivability. That said, when you say that to cavalrymen, they look at you rather strangely. According to them, the efficiency is between 50 and 55 tons, and it is necessary to preserve the logic of the tank as it is today. However, they know their subject well. And the international market thinks like them. We cannot ignore this, knowing that the budgetary sustainability of the effort depends on the export success of the program.
In addition, the Leclerc evolved has a very valuable asset: it exists! It is almost an off-the-shelf solution, which meets the expectations of many countries. So I am integrating here an urgency and market character, which modifies the perception of the response to the need, knowing that the LE is a transitional solution.