Unquestionably, the Leclerc Evolution, presented by KNDS, was one of the flagship armored vehicles of the Eurosatory 2024 show, which closes its doors this Friday. This tank achieves, in fact, the synthesis between the Leclerc EAU (United Arab Emirates) and the EMBT turret, presented in 2022 during the previous edition of this show.
Thus, the Leclerc Evolution can claim to invite itself, without fading, in the new intermediate generation of combat tanks currently being designed, alongside the Leopard 2AX/3, developed by KNDS Germany, from the KF51 Panther of Rheinmetall, the American M1E3 Abrams, and the Russian T-14, especially since it is presented, by its designers, as “ready to produce”, on an international market in high demand.
However, as the order of 18 Leopard 2A8 by the Bundeswehr, had launched the international career of this armored vehicle, ordered, or soon ordered, by four other European countries in just one year, the KNDS France super-tank must, above all, obtain an order from the Army of French soil, to position itself credibly on the international scene.
Unfortunately for the Leclerc Evolution, and the KNDS strategy, the Army, like the Ministry of the Armed Forces, has, for the moment, no intention, nor the means, to acquire the new French tank.
In this section:
The tank is not the priority of the Army today
And for good reason. By the French Army’s own admission, tanks are not, for her, the priority today. Indeed, it must, within the framework of the LPM 2024-2030, carry out numerous programs, which will be difficult to finance in their entirety, with, in particular, the deployment of the Griffon, Serval and Jaguar of the SCORPION program, the design and order of the VBAE to replace the VBL, the acquisition of the 109 Caesar MkII which must form the backbone of the French artillery, or the modernization of the Tiger attack helicopters and the entry into service of the H- 160M Guépard, for ALAT.
This forced modernization, the consequence of 25 years of underinvestment in replacing equipment, and intensive use of resources in Afghanistan, the Levant and the Sahel strip, leaves almost no room for maneuver for the state. -major of the Army, to possibly seize opportunities that emerged during this LPM.
Beyond these perfectly clear constraints over the next six years, the Army also suffers from a staff in which the light forces, Legion, marine troops and paratroopers, are over-represented compared to to line units, in particular battle tanks.
Thus, over the last 10 years, the Army has been commanded by a paratrooper (Gal Bosser), a legionnaire (Gal Burkhard) and a TdM (Gal Schill), while the position of Major General has been assumed by two paratroopers. (Gal de La Chesnais and Gomart), a genius (Gal Quevilly), and two horsemen (Gal Barrera and Béchon), but having cut their teeth, essentially, in light cavalry.
Given this tropism for light and maneuver forces, the modernization imperatives affecting all equipment, including the omnipresent range of medium armored vehicles, the recent operational history and budgetary constraints, it is hardly surprising that the capabilities of French line, battle tanks, heavy artillery and mechanized infantry, have hardly been at the center of the concerns of the Army staff.
Thus, while these means are at the heart of the conflict in Ukraine against Russia, they are the poor relations of the efforts made by the Army in the LPM 2024-2030, with a limited modernization of only 160 Leclerc, the order of 109 Caesar MkII called to form the entire 155 mm artillery of the AT and the absence of modernization of the VBCI.
KNDS strategy far from the French expectations that gave birth to it
In addition to these purely military and budgetary considerations, there is a probable political disappointment concerning the strategy, however relevant, established by KNDS, around the Leopard 2A-RC 3.0 and Leclerc Evolution, in preparation for the MGCS.
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It is rare that I radically disagree with you but the assertion "If it were that simple, remember that it would have been done a long time ago" is only an argument from authority, the inaccuracy of which is repeatedly demonstrated by History.
Pluralist democracies are based on the principle of will: will of the Nation through the expression of suffrage then will of elected officials.
It is on this last point that the system has been failing for several decades: do you think that General de Gaulle or even Georges Pompidou would have renounced essential and even vital modernizations of the country, the army or the industry at the time? seen from the pseudo-debt wall?
Can anyone explain the magic figure of 3% deficit not to be exceeded according to the European Commission?
You know the Anglo-Saxon adage “To big to fail”.
Do you see France bankrupt given its debt or its deficit? It is reducing History to its financial or economic dimension
It is, if I may allow myself and with all the consideration that I have for you and your very often relevant and even brilliant analyses, kitchen Marxism as there is kitchen Latin (Excuse me for teasing you on a such a serious subject!)
And it was Marx who wrote “Misery of the economy” (And Emmanuel Todd, I think)
What I mean by this is that a reading of the reports of the Court of Auditors and the Regional Chambers of Auditors and especially the implementation of their recommendations will make it possible to easily recover the billions necessary for the acquisition of 1200 Leclerc Evolution in the financial conditions that you describe so convincingly
cordially
In fact, the 3% rule is not an empirical value, but a calculation value. This is the average debt sustainability threshold, so that growth, associated with inflation, makes it possible to maintain stable the weight of debt repayment on public wealth. It should, in fact, be adapted by country and by year, depending on macroeconomic parameters. But the value of 3% is an acceptable average for countries sharing the EU's social and economic criteria.
Beyond that, the debt burden increases. That is to say, we must produce more wealth to compensate for its increase. As growth is not very strong, and inflation has returned to low values, we cannot ignore the consequences of this debt. This is all the more so since being in the Euro, a slippage in French debt affects the debt of the euro zone, and therefore, the interest rates of all its players. And Germany or the Netherlands have no intention of paying more of their debt because France does not respect its commitments.
De Gaulle and Pompidou had a thriving economy, surplus budgets, and very sustained growth, with unemployment so low that it was necessary to massively import labor from North Africa. It is difficult, in these conditions, to speculate on the position they would have taken in the present situation. personally, in any case, I wouldn't risk it.
We should refer to what the Court of Auditors was able to write in its reports on PPP public-private partnerships and remember the enlightening example of the Évry Corbeil hospital
PPPs are profitable for the private sector and extremely expensive for the public
It is the contractual form of the good old formula "Privatization of profits, socialization by public budgets of losses"
The Court of Auditors and the Finance Inspectorate advise against this financing formula, which is detrimental to public interests.
Besides, it seems to me that there are no more.
It was a moment in the financial history of France where private interests linked to certain political parties were able to prosper at the expense of the taxpayer.
Then there were the big international consulting firms…
Each era has its own technique for enriching oneself to the detriment of the State and citizens…
In this case, here, the PPP only serves to ensure that the state has a right of oversight and a certain control over the company which owns the equipment of its armies.
The problem is that if the company is public, or simply if the state is in the majority, in a set-up of this type, the company's debt (necessarily gigantic to finance this type of program) is combined with the sovereign debt, making the model lose all interest. So the PPP is the only alternative, even if, in this case, it is a question of control and not of financing.
I would like to disagree with you on the question of national borrowing.
Although the State is in debt in France, the French have significant savings.
In the USA, both the State and citizens are heavily in debt.
In France there are the savings necessary to finance a massive rearmament effort.
The question of the creditor is fundamental: if it is French citizens who are creditors of their own State, there is no need to fear the subjective judgments of international markets and rating agencies.
What poses a problem is more the identity of the debt holder than its level.
The typical example of this situation is Japan, which is a very indebted country but whose debt is held almost exclusively by Japanese taxpayer citizens, thus ensuring the financial and therefore strategic independence of the country.
However, this does not solve the problem of the deficit or the sovereign debt, which is the major obstacle here. Yes it's better. Moreover, the defense base was based on a massive call for savings. But thinking that a national loan is the solution is a mistake. If it were that simple, just think it would have been done a very long time ago. More summarized, the origin of funds is, today, largely secondary to the wall of public finances in this issue. That said, once this wall has been circumvented, if it is possible, yes, favoring a national debt is preferable.
It is so much easier for our “big” Gamelin heads to prepare for the last (even) lost war than to anticipate and predict the future. Launching a “national defense” loan from French savers would perhaps be a solution to accelerate our land (300 tanks in real) AND maritime (2 PAN at sea) rearmament permanently and one in repair. But we must not rush them too much, let them digest their staff feasts and other regal pleasures.
A national loan, defense or not, would add to public deficits and sovereign debt. This would bring nothing more than traditional financing to the markets.
Yes Fabrice and even more so since you sold us a great financing mechanism.
We are creating a coalition of Leclerc Evolved buyers. We agree on a number all grouped together (like 2 or 3k)
We pay those of France from the budgetary return.
QED.
Above all, this would provide a good indication of the state of mind of the people of France towards their defense policy and would show their moral commitment.
We can do this without increasing the deficits, using a solution based on a public-private investment company carrying out the developments and purchases of equipment, and renting them to the armies, to provide a buffer until the return is fully effective. budgetary. This is fully the model of the Defense Base.
No, the industrialists and this is normal, defend their activities..We have seen and we see the excesses of the miltaro industrial complex in the US and in Germany
It is the military who must allocate the resources.
We must face, for example, in the Mediterranean more credible scenarios (certainly as much) as a mechanized assault on Strasbourg. The rise in tensions with Algeria is probable with or without RN in the long term.
To consider that the battle tank is useless and to exceed it is to have a very bad reading of the conflict in Ukraine. Supporting our manufacturers like Nexter means making an important contribution to our commercial balance, see Dassault
Good article, demonstrating the difficulty for the Ministry of the Armed Forces to support its industry. The economic interest is well mentioned, the future government needs to be more attentive to its industrialists than its generals.
your future government has ignored the army in its program.
Worrying.