Since its presentation to the Council of Ministers on April 4, many things have been said or written about the future Military Programming Law. If the members of the presidential majority rightly see it as an unprecedented effort in favor of the armies, their opponents most often underline its shortcomings and shortcomings, in the face of rapid changes in the international context, which is just as justified. The fact, objectively, if the budgetary effort granted by the government is indisputable, it is however not sufficient to give back to the armies deeply handicapped by 25 years of under-investment, the means which would be necessary for them to give the executive the ability to "Choose our wars and win them", to use General de Gaulle's famous maxim. Beyond the context obliging the 3 armies to have to modernize and reconstitute simultaneously much more capacities than they should in 7 years of time in normal regime, inflation and geopolitical upheavals act as factors significantly eroding the reality of the promised budgetary effort, leading them to tangent the format defined in the 2013 White Paper (225 combat aircraft, 200 tanks, 15 frigates, etc.) while the international context was beyond measure with today.
If there is no doubt that the executive will be satisfied with its LPM, the vote of the Law in parliament will be very different from what it was in 2018 for the LPM 2019-2025. Indeed, not only does the presidential majority no longer have an absolute legislative majority to guarantee its adoption, but the intensive use of article 49.3 of the constitution within the framework of the budget, prohibits the use of this mechanism. for the LPM which will be debated in June in all probability. In fact, parliamentarians, deputies and senators alike now have a much greater power of amendment than it did in 2018, so as to eventually give the armed forces the means necessary to achieve their objectives, in particular by freeing up resources for the acquisition of defense equipment beyond those planned by the bill today.
However, for such an amendment to see the light of day, and above all to be adopted, it still has to simultaneously respect several imperatives. For the armies on the one hand, these cannot be destabilized by the questioning of the acquisitions of equipment already planned by the LPM 2024-2030. Furthermore, and this goes without saying (but it goes all the better by saying it), it is necessary to rely on valid legislative mechanisms, so as to strictly supervise the execution of the amendment. Above all, it is essential that the acquisition mechanisms presented have resources that do not increase the sovereign debt, or handicap the efforts undertaken to reduce the budget deficits in accordance with the expectations of the European authorities. In summary, to be adopted, any amendment must have its own sources of funding, made available to the armies in the form of exceptional revenue to increase their immediate capacity to invest in new equipment. But where to find such budgetary resources?
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The means, the resources do exist, only the courage and the political will to face the waste and the state and regional mismanagement mean that the necessary and sufficient budgets are not allocated to the vital needs of the Nation...
I take the liberty of thanking you for this remarkable and instructive article which presents an in-depth and reasoned reflection on the fundamental problem of the financing of National Defence.
However, I agree with Mr. Fournier's opinion
When we consider the total amount of public expenditure - State, local authorities, public establishments - to which we add social expenditure - I will be told that these are contributions of an insurance nature, which is partially inaccurate -, amount compared to the GDP, one can be surprised that it is so difficult to find a few additional points of GDP to finance what is the raison d'être of the creation of the State, in this case the protection and the survival of the nation
National Defense must be the priority expenditure
If this is not the case, this reveals a serious problem of apprehension of the Real among our leaders.
I admit that I thought that the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war would open the eyes of many "politicians" and that the LPM would translate this awareness...
This is not the case and it seems to me to reveal the decadence of our dear old country….
I understand your point of view. But do you really think that it is mostly shared in public opinion? The objective of the article is to propose an alternative to increase investments in the political and social context of the country, taking into account the sensitivities and political dogmas that animate the two parliamentary chambers.
I do not know the majority feeling of public opinion on this point; I am certain that the theme of National Defense is one of the least treated by polling institutes or opinion studies which focus, apart from voting intentions, on unemployment, purchasing power, insecurity and currently pensions
Even if I deplore that the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war did not provoke a stronger reaction from the government, I have noted, like you, a certain awareness by certain parliamentarians and a certain evolution of public opinion, even if I don't have the means to evaluate it
I do not dispute the effort made within the framework of the future LPM. You are the first to say that it is insufficient and you are making the effort to look for solutions to finance other expenses…a useful approach that I have studied carefully.
and But I think it is necessary to develop "the political sensitivities and dogmas that animate the two parliamentary chambers", knowing that under the Véme République, it is the President of the Republic, head of the Armies who has the hand
It's time for him to resort to “whatever the cost”;;;
France was able to engage in whatever the cost because all European countries then shared the same perception of the emergency in the face of Covid. The situation is radically different today, and Brussels will not let us increase the deficits to arm our defense. The only feasible option in this area is to potentially remove deterrent spending from the deficit and sovereign debt count. That is possibly playable with many negotiations. There is an article on the subject here.
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This is of course only a personal opinion therefore subjective and relative but I think that if "Brussels" means the European Commission, its influence and its power are overestimated
It seems to me to be very weakened by Brexit, condemnations from the ECJ and glaring inefficiency in the fight against the crisis linked to Covid.
The solution that you mention is ingenious and can only be challenged with difficulty by an entity that takes second place to NATO in terms of defence….this is in the vital interests of the States, not at the European confederal level…
[…] April 11, 2023 7 […]