Is technology moving too fast for industrial defense programs?

Since 2 years the United States Marine Corps has begun a deep reflection on the nature of its mission in the years to come, and on the means at its disposal to carry it out successfully against a technologically advanced adversary with significant military resources, as can be the case. Chinese People's Liberation Army, all in a budgetary context that is at best frozen, at worst shrinking. The first advances in this reflection came to light with the publication, last year, ofa new intervention doctrine for the Corps, based on smaller units, much more mobile and agile, acting in a cooperative information bubble allowing to strike the enemy where he does not expect it, and to let him strike where no one is anymore . In other words, it was a question for the HQ of the US Marines Corps to be inspired by the operational methods of the special forces and the famous Hit & Fade, strike and disappear, to gain the advantage on the 'opponent.

Beyond doctrine, the Corps has also profoundly modified its organization, eliminating its heavy tank units inherited from a time when it mainly intervened as a classic infantry force, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, and from the United States. majority of its artillery units, while engaging in the development of weapons systems adapted to this new doctrine, as in the case of the Light Amphibious Warship, ships of just over 60 meters in length capable of transporting and landing 75 marines with their equipment, and with a range of 3500 miles sufficient for movement in the peaceful zone. But beyond the organic transformations underway, and a few programs identified in Quick-Win to respond to the Chinese threat, the technological future of the body still remains to be determined.

The US Marines Corps plans to have around 75 Light Amphibious Warships or LAWs capable of landing and supporting a combat unit of XNUMX Marines with their equipment and combat vehicles in the Pacific Islands.

As proof, the cancellation of the replacement of the LAV-25 light amphibious armored vehicles by similar vehicles, the General Staff now judging them to be too vulnerable or ill-suited to the needs, whether they are in tracked or 8 × 8 version, in comparison of other systems using, for example, robotization. But if the US Marines Corps knows what's wrong, or more, he remains unable, today, to define what he will really need for this type of mission in the years to come, the parameters are so numerous and the technology fluctuating and rapid. Coming from the Army that has inspired the last few months new British doctrines et australian, there is reason to wonder about the adequacy between current industrial defense programs and future needs, or on the very possibility of designing equipment today with a date of entry into service beyond a few years.

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