The future format of the US Navy, and by corollary the planning concerning the construction of ships for the coming years, is the subject of an intense confrontation between the office of the Secretary of Defense supported by the Pentagon on the one hand, and the White House through the Office of Management and Budget of the Department of Defense on the other hand. For the latter, the US Navy must do everything possible to respect the “political” format of 355 ships online for 2030 promised by candidate Trump before his election. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD in English, for its part presented a schedule reducing the construction of future destroyers for the next 5 years by 40%, going from 11 new ships to 6, while accelerating the withdrawal from service of Ticonderoga-class cruisers, which would go from 13 units to 9 units over the same period. Far from aiming for the objective of 355 ships demanded by the President, the number of ships in service in the US Navy would then increase from 293 today to 287 in 2025.
If Donald Trump seeks above all to comfort his electorate, more fond of symbols than reason, the US Navy today finds itself largely constrainede by the choices that have been made over the last 30 years concerning both its surface ships and its submarines. Indeed, the American Navy had decided to equip itself mainly with large naval units, ignoring medium and coastal units, such as frigates, corvettes, or conventionally powered submarines. Not only does an Arleigh Burke destroyer alone cost the price of 4 FDI frigates (as an example), but it requires almost double the crew compared to the French frigates. Certainly, a Burke has three times more firepower than an FDI, but it does not, until now, have the gift of ubiquity, even though it also “counts” for a single ship .
With its 67 Burke destroyers in service, as well as its 19 Ticonderoga cruisers, 11 Nimitz and Ford class nuclear supercarriers, 8 Wasp and America class LHDs, 52 Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines, Sea Wolf and Virginia, and 12 Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, the US Navy has the largest fleet in the world, by category and tonnage, regarding large naval units. But the absence of frigates or corvettes, conventionally powered submarines or AIPs, and lighter assault ships and aircraft carriers, generates immense pressure on manpower and the budget as soon as we try to align with the Chinese model and its 430 ships today.
Indeed, Beijing has made radically different choices from those of Washington. Without taking into account the missile patrol boats, although they have real firepower, the People's Liberation Army Navy has a much more complete range of ships. Thus, for around ten years, Chinese shipyards have produced a sixty Type 056 and 056A corvettes specialized in coastal anti-submarine warfare, more than thirty Type 054 and 054A frigates for anti-submarine warfare offshore, around twenty Type 052 destroyers for anti-aircraft warfare, two Type 055 multipurpose cruisers, 2 aircraft carrier Type 001/A and 9 assault ships Type 072 and 075. A 054-ton Type 4000A frigate, carrying 32 vertical silos and a crew of 160 men, costs a sixth of the price of an Arleigh Burke destroyer. Difficult, in these conditions, to compare a fleet format based solely on the number of ships.
But the comparison based on the overall tonnage of the fleet is hardly more relevant, although very favorable to the US Navy with 3,5 million tons, compared to 1 million tons for the Chinese fleet, and 320.000 for the Navy. French National. Indeed, a 10.000 ton destroyer costing almost €2 billion like the Burke will only be able to provide air protection for one capital ship (aircraft carrier, LHD, etc.) at a time, or only track down a single submarine. marine. However, this mission can also be entrusted to specialized frigates or destroyers providing the same added value as a Burke in these specific missions, for a much lower price and number of men.
Beyond the relatively sterile opposition between the White House and the Pentagon on the purely political question of the 355 warships for the US Navy, it is in reality the breakdown of the typologies of ships forming the battle corps of this navy , and the choices that have been made over the last 30 years which pose a problem today. By neglecting lighter units, the US Navy artificially constrained its format, and consequently its intervention capabilities, in favor of a domination which was intended above all to be technological and symbolic, and represented by ships that were particularly imposing, such as aircraft carriers or heavy cruisers and destroyers, or excessively technological, such as the Littoral Combat Ship and the Zumwalt destroyers. The result was an immense financial waste and a relative weakening for the benefit of the PLA which, for its part, demonstrated surprising foresight for a Navy without much experience in this area.
In fact, today, while the US Navy struggles to produce 2 destroyers, 2 FFG/X frigates and 2 LCS each year, Chinese construction sites produce 2 to 3 Type 055 cruisers, 3 Type 052D destroyers, 3 Type 054B frigates and 5 to 6 Type 056A corvettes over the same period. The same goes for large naval units (aircraft carriers, LHD) and submarines. Naturally, under these conditions, the PLA will quickly catch up with the US Navy, and overtake it.
Unfortunately, in the United States, neither the President who is only interested in a symbol represented by the number of ships, nor the Pentagon which aims above all for technological advantage, nor the Congress which seems to only care about local jobs. created, do not address the problem in its entirety, by proposing to produce fewer destroyers, and perhaps fewer aircraft carriers, for the benefit of numerous frigates and corvettes. This would resolve, without the slightest doubt, the president's problem, and would significantly strengthen the intervention capabilities of the US Navy around the world.