On the occasion of the MAKS-2019 exhibition, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov declared to the TASS agency that the first serial copies of the heavy stealth combat drone S70 Okhontik-B will enter service from 2025 with the Russian forces. On the other hand, a sustained flight test phase will take place from 2023 to 2024, including modifications intended for carriage and the use of the various equipment and weapons that the drone should use.
At the same time, we learned that the future Russian heavy combat drone could be used in 3 modes:
- a mode entirely controlled by a pilot using the satellite link like many current UCAVs
- a fully automated mode, the drone carrying out a pre-determined flight following a defined flight plan, but employing on-board AI to make the necessary operational adaptations. It is specified, however, that the commitment decision will not be delegated to Artificial Intelligence, and that it will remain subject to human decision.
- A mixed mode, in which the drone could be partly controlled by a combat aircraft, such as the Su-57.
It is interesting to note that, according to statements made to date, Russian engineers do not seem to be evolving towards the notion of Loyal Wingman, like the eponymous program of the US Air Force, but that this approach will remain possible via mixed mode. . Likewise, the Okhotnik seems intended for a much broader spectrum of missions than the " Remote Carriers” of the FCAS program.
Although intended to be deployed in high-risk areas in place of piloted aircraft, the Okhotnik does not fall into the category of drones with acceptable attrition, the direction in which the Franco-German program seems to be heading, as well as the Valkyrie program across the Atlantic.
On the contrary, by its size, its mass of 20 tonnes, its extensive carrying capacities and its probably high price by Russian standards, the Okhotnik-B enters a category of combat drones comparable to that of the American X47 or the Dassault neuron. This is also the axis chosen by several Chinese combat drone programs.
We may wonder, knowing that France and its partners have acquired very significant know-how around the Neuron program and the almost €500 million invested, why the country is not developing its own combat drone, capable of strengthening the fleet of Rafale and Mirage 2000 at the top of the operational spectrum, notably for the elimination of anti-aircraft sites and tactical missile batteries, pending the entry into service of the FCAS?