On this last day of the electoral campaign for Europeans, the idea of creating a European army returns to the forefront, with thepublication of a column co-signed by more than sixty deputies and senators of the presidential majority, advocating a European Army to guarantee peace on the Old Continent. Tribune immediately denounced and criticized by opposition actors, judging it to be meaningless and, in a certain way, misleading.
It is striking to note, in this matter, that the vast majority of positions expressed are based solely on the expression of personal convictions, and that at no time has an objective reflection been carried out to know whether or not , such a project was feasible, and if so, in what form. Supporters of the idea highlight probable macro-political benefits in the very long term, ignoring the reality of European differences on the subject. Opponents, for their part, list these divergences and the difficulties that such a project could encounter, and are content to judge them as too important to be able to overcome. The subject was all the more poorly treated, politically and in the media, as Emmanuel Macron, like Angela Merkel, spoke out in favor of this project, without being able to outline its broad outlines, giving free rein to all possible interpretations, and therefore to all oppositions.
However, the need for a rapid and massive strengthening of European defense capabilities is hardly in doubt today, given the rise in power of Russian military force, a country that is 4 times less populated and 10 times less rich than the European Union, and yet capable today of sweeping away all conventional European forces, which are very vulnerable without the help of the United States; China which is developing a military force which will equal or even surpass American power in less than 3 decades; Turkey, whose membership in NATO seems to be increasingly compromised, and whose president is getting closer every day to V. Putin and Xi Jinping; or the Sunni alliance, made up of all the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf and a galaxy of Sunni-majority countries, such as Egypt, which is continuously strengthening its military force as well as its defense industry, and is taking on more and more every day. 'independence ; to name only the most direct threats. Added to this is the erratic behavior of the United States, demanding unfailing allegiance from Europeans, as shown by recent tensions over European funds dedicated to the Defense industry, and which, above all, will have to concentrate more each year their forces in the Pacific to control Chinese military power, reducing, de facto, the military potential deployable in Europe.
Under these conditions, and knowing that no European country today has the capacity to oppose these threats alone, nor to impose itself in Europe as a unifying element of a coherent defense effort on a national scale. Union, the logic of a “European Army” makes sense, and cannot be satisfied with a simple rejection, without proposing an effective and efficient alternative solution.
On the other hand, we understand, the risk to be dealt with is not polymorphous, and boils down to being able to protect the continent like each of the members of the European Union, facing an adversary capable of leading the conflict on its own. ground. The need is therefore purely defensive, and, by nature, must be proportionate to be perfectly dissuasive, whatever the enemy. Therefore, it is not necessary to seek to design a federalization of European armies, a project contested by the majority of European leaders, and which constitutes the main angle of attack of opponents of the European army project.
It is possible, on the other hand, to design a new military force made up of reservists, in a logic of matrix control between States and Europe, and whose function would be limited to the defense of the continent and the members of the Union, to the image of the American National Guard, whose supervision and use are shared between the states and the federal government. In this approach, each European state would retain its national forces, with total autonomy of use, and could call on its own component of the national guard if necessary. The governance of the European Union, which will need to be adapted, will also be able to mobilize this “ European Guard“, to respond to existential threats, without this being perceived by our neighbors as a threat, the tool being structurally forced to limit its intervention to European territory only. Furthermore, such a model would make it possible to balance defense efforts between European countries, in a more subtle way and adapted to the economic, social and demographic realities of each country, much more effectively than a simple spending objective relative to GDP, which lost much meaning as the world rearmed itself.
As we can see, Defense Europe, and the principle of the European Army, require a methodical and objective approach to respond to the challenges of European security in the decades to come. There is no question, in a simple article, of proposing a complete model for building such an army. On the other hand, as we have just seen, it is possible to imagine models potentially responding to the challenges and in line with European reality today, as long as we agree to move away from political and dogmatic postures, and that we agree to look at the issues, the risks, as well as the means, with the desire to guarantee the security of the Union, and therefore, of the French.