The US Special Forces Command is very unhappy with the announced postponement of the LAA[efn_note]Light Attack Aircraft[/efn_note] program by the US Air Force. In January 2019, following rapid changes in geopolitical situations around the world raising fears of a resurgence of high-intensity conflicts, the US Air Force Command announced that the LAA program was postponed without giving later dates, considering that the credits should be concentrated on the acquisition of more efficient aircraft, such as the F35.
However, if the US Air Force is preparing today for the wars of tomorrow, the SOCOM[efn_note]Special Operation COmmandant[/efn_note] has an immediate need for the capabilities that this program should provide, in particular those of being able to provide close fire support to forces engaged in low and medium intensity theatres. Indeed, a light aircraft, such as the A29, can stay much longer above the engagement zone than a modern fighter, which must be refueled every hour to maintain the same position. In addition, the costs of use are much lower, making it possible to have, at the same cost, more support capacity over time.
The US Air Force believes, for its part, that this type of need should be addressed through the combined use of drones, rotary wings and combat aircraft, so as to optimize the versatility of its arsenal, rather than specialize it, a light attack aircraft would have very little use in a high-intensity conflict.
This opposition is reminiscent of that of the US Air Force with the US Army, regarding close air support aircraft. The US army wants to maintain a fleet of A10 fighter bombers to support ground forces, while the Air Force absolutely wants to get rid of them in favor of the F35. As in the case of the light attack aircraft, the USAF believes that the A10 will have no use in a modern high-intensity conflict, as it would be vulnerable to modern ground-to-air systems. But, on the contrary, neither an F16 nor an F35 have firepower comparable to that of the A10, firepower which has often been beneficial to the forces of the US Army, in Iraq as in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, if the Air Force is not very enthusiastic about the idea of keeping its close air support fleets, whether they are equipped with A10s or A29s, it is even less enthusiastic about the idea of transferring this responsibility to the US Army, or to SOCOM. This is not a question of any tactical or technological consideration, but of purely political considerations, the same ones which condemned the AH-56 Cheyenne program, an aircraft which was 20 years ahead of current technologies. in the 70s, but whose performance, particularly in terms of speed, threatened the Air Force's hegemony over fixed-wing aircraft.
We therefore understand the efforts made by the US Army for its FVL[efn_note]Futur Vertical Lift[/efn_note] program, and in particular to have rotary wings with performances comparable to those of light combat aircraft intended for close air support.