In an interview given to the Association of the US Army, Brigadier General Ross Coffman, in charge of combat vehicle modernization, indicated that the replacement for the M1 Abrams tank would not necessarily be a tank.
Beyond the fantasies of imperial quadripods attacking the frozen moon of Hott, recent technological developments are indeed likely to modify the response to the problem of the battle tank, namely combining mobility, firepower and protection, with a view to achieve a rapid and decisive effect in military maneuver.
It is true that several recent engagements have shown the limits of the use of tanks, particularly in an urban environment, or against organized and seasoned adversaries capable of exploiting the tactical weaknesses of the device. Thus, during the first Chechen war, the Russian T80s sent to Grosny were literally cut to pieces by the Chechen infantry posted high up in the city's buildings, beyond the maximum elevation of the Russian tank gun. More recently, during the first Turkish intervention in Syria, several Leopard 2 tanks were destroyed by Syrian rebels, taking advantage of the absence of infantry and the poor training of the crews.
If some saw in these engagements the planned end of the heavy tank, other interventions showed that, well used, the tank continued to fulfill its function with efficiency. This was particularly the case of the Emirati column in Yemen, which brilliantly used its tanks and on-board infantry, both in urban and desert environments.
No more than the battles of Crecy and Agincourt sounded the death knell for the cavalry, the setbacks of the battle tank invite strategists and industrialists to adapt the concept to the reality of modern engagement.
However, several technological advances are likely to modify the nature of the battle tank. Firstly, we are witnessing a shift in means of protection, from passive protection provided by armor or reactive armor, to active protection, detecting and intercepting threats before they strike the armored vehicle. In fact, the need for passive shielding, which is by nature very heavy, is disappearing in the face of lighter and more effective technological solutions.
Secondly, like warships or combat aircraft, the tank will have to increase its capacity to produce and store energy, whether to power the multiple computer systems that make it up, and to power directed energy weaponswhich are making their appearance. Unlike a conventional cannon, a directed energy weapon is much less constrained in terms of fire capacity by carrying ammunition. In addition, the explosion of ammunition following a hit is one of the main causes of the effective destruction of tanks.
Finally, in the logic of cooperative engagement and system of systems, the battle tank evolves towards a drone control and cooperative fire unit. Thus, the T14 Armata integrates a wire-guided reconnaissance drone specially designed for urban engagements, allowing short-distance reconnaissance of routes and objectives. In this spirit, nothing now obliges the tank to be limited to a single unit with its entire arsenal, and we can perfectly imagine drones in charge of anti-tank fire, as well as anti-personnel protection, or even upstream mine clearance.
In any case, if the appearance of the battle tank may indeed evolve in the years to come, its mission and its main characteristics will most likely remain the same, among these, the psychological power of the tank over the adversary. If the power of a tank of tomorrow will no longer be assessed by its mass, the thickness of its armor and the diameter of its gun, the combination of its firepower and its apparent invulnerability will most certainly continue to be a determining factor in the battles to come.