Following his recent appointment, the new Chinese Defense Minister, Wei Fenghe, reserved his first international visit for his Russian counterpart, General Shoigu. “ I visited Russia as Minister of Defense of China to show the world the high level of development of our bilateral relations, and the firm determination of our armed forces to strengthen their strategic cooperation » declared the Chinese minister at the end of his visit, according to the Tass agency.
He also specifically indicated that this visit was part of the joint effort between Russia and China to “ fight against a liberal world order dominated by the United States ».
The statements by the Chinese Minister of Defense are far from being innocuous, or part of a simple semantic escalation linked to the renewed economic tensions between China and the United States. Indeed, for the first time, there is mention of military cooperation between the two nuclear powers, although the term “alliance” was not mentioned.
And this rapprochement is something to worry Western and American strategists. Because, if Western forces remain generally superior to those of China or Russia, a simultaneous deterioration in both theaters would pose a very significant problem for Western forces, the United States having to deploy more than 50% of its forces to balance each front. In other words, in the event of simultaneous war action by Russia (and allies) in Europe, and China (and allies) in the Pacific zone and/or against India, the West would be in a very bad position. .
However, what do we think of what looks like a Russian-Chinese alliance?
If the political rapprochement on the international scene between Russia and China is often highlighted, economic and social cooperation is far from being as dynamic. Thus, China is only the 4th economic investor in Russia, after Italy, Germany and above all, France, several companies of which (Renault, Auchan, Société Générale, etc.) have invested massively in the Russian economy, and have continued to do so despite the crisis and sanctions. China, for its part, was content to buy a few bankrupt companies, without saving them, and very appropriately offered its agricultural products to compensate for the Russian embargo on European agricultural imports.
In addition, tensions are appearing in Eastern Siberia, where the expatriate Chinese population has outnumbered the Russian population in several Oblasts, creating social and economic friction, and making Moscow fear “historic” territorial claims from Beijing on territories having belonged to the Chinese Empire, see the Mongol Empire. However, the protection of Russian-speaking minorities and historical demands were the two levers used by the Kremlin to justify its operations in Georgia and Ukraine, and it now fears finding itself on the wrong side of the border.
On the other hand, tensions between China and India have continued to increase for several years, and a war was even narrowly avoided in the summer of 2017 on the Doklam plateau. However, India is the largest customer of the Russian Defense Industry, with more than $10 billion in annual orders. These orders contribute greatly to supporting the Russian Defense industry and its 1,3 million employees, while acting as an important source of foreign currency and income for the Russian federal state. A war between China and its Pakistani ally, and India, would put Russia in an extremely delicate political and economic situation.
Finally, although Russia recently agreed to export its Su-35S fighter and the S-400 air defense system to China, both to appear less isolated on the international scene following the annexation of Crimea, and to record the first export orders for these weapons systems and earn essential foreign exchange, there are numerous disputes between Russia and China concerning illicit copies of exported Russian military equipment. So the hunters J15et J11are derivative copies of the Russian Su-33 and Su-27 fighters, and are built without a license. Many Chinese missiles and armored vehicles are also unlicensed copies of Russian equipment. This approach led Russia to suspend all arms deliveries to China, particularly the most modern equipment.
In any case, the alliance under construction between China and Russia resembles more of an alliance of circumstances, like that which linked the United States and the USSR during the Second World War, than of an alliance of principles, like the alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. This is not reassuring, however, because it indicates that the perception of the need for an alliance with the West goes beyond the structural differences between the two countries. This says a lot about the feelings of the two countries regarding the United States, and by transitivity, the West, and the risks that result from it.